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1. Introduction 
The Issue of Public Sector Collective Bargaining 
PERHAPS THE MOST significant single phenomenon III the area of 
labor relations in the past ten years has been the rapid emergence 
of collective bargaining in the public sector of the United States 
economy. This phenomenon has occurred at all levels of govern-
ment and has encompassed many diverse groups of employees. Of 
course, the major labor legislation which has been enacted in this 
country-the Wagner Act, the Taft-Hartley Act and the Landrum-
Griffin Act-has excluded consideration of public sector employees. 
But the signing of Executive Order 10988 by President John F. 
Kennedy in 1962 opened the door to collective bargaining arrange-
ments for federal employees. It also led state legislatures across 
the country to pass laws according public employees most of the 
rights which their private sector counterparts had earlier acquired. 
This phenomenon raises some new and important questions 
for economists. The profession has been concerned for some time 
with the wage and employment effects of unions, but this concern 
has centered primarily on those private sector labor markets where 
unions have historically been strong. The belief persists that labor 
markets in the public sector are somehow different. Recently, for 
instance, several attempts have been made to develop theories of 
wage determination in public employment, and most of these the-
oretical undertakings have considered unionization in some way as 
a relevant variable. 1 
Moreover, from a public policy point of view, improvement in 
our knowledge of the effects of collective bargaining in the public 
sector is crucial. In the private sector experts have long recognized 
the social, political, and economic legitimacy of unions. Albert 
Rees, for example, in his well-known book The Economics of Trade 
Unions, states: 
If the job rights won for workers by unions are not conceded by the rest of 
society simply because they are just, they should be conceded because they help 
to protect the minimum consensus that keeps our society stable. In my judge-
ment, the economic losses impossed by unions are not too high a price to pay 
for their successful performance of this role. 2 
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However, the applicability of this type of argument to unioniza-
tion in the public sector has been seriously questioned. In an 
important recent book, Harry H. Wellington and Ralph K. Winter, 
Jr., have argued: 
Collective bargaining in public employment ... seems distinguishable from 
that in the private sector. ... It imposes on society more than a potential 
misallocation of resources through restrictions on economic output, the principal 
cost imposed by private sector unions. Collective bargaining by public employees 
and the political process cannot be separated ... the issue is how powerful 
unions will be in the typical municipal political process if a full transplant of 
collective bargaining is carried out. 
The conclusion is that such a transplant would, in many cases, institu· 
tionalize the power of public employee unions in a way that would leave 
competing groups in the political process at a permanent and substantial dis-
advantage. 3 
Besides the inconvenience to voters and the possibility that 
prolonged disruption of public sector service provision would 
endanger the public health and safety, Wellington and Winter 
envison another reason, economic in nature, which might give 
unions in the public sector an advantage greater than that which 
exists for their private sector counterparts. In their view, the 
demand for many public sector goods and services is relatively 
inelastic. Hence, because the demand for labor is a derived demand, 
the wage-employment trade off is reduced for workers in public 
employment and union power may be realized more easily and 
exploiLed more fully than in the private sector. 4 
The above arguments suggest a need for extensive research into 
the area of wage and salary effects of collective bargaining in the 
public sector. For a number of reasons, the group of workers for 
which research appears most fruitful is public school teachers. First, 
from a pragmatic point of view, data are more readily available for 
this public sector profession than for most. This stems from the 
relative maturity of the teacher organizational movement. Teachers 
have been organized into professional organizations, some affiliated 
with organized labor and many not so affiliated, for over 100 years. 
Since the turn of the century, these organizations have been fairly 
active in collecting and compiling data on the profession. 
Secondly, teachers' salaries have historically been ranked toward 
the bottom of all professional employments, and cost-of-living in-
creases in the 1960s probably eroded this position even further. G 
Thus the profession was particularly responsive to the recent public 
sector bargaining movement. 
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Finally, the early successes with collective bargaining experi-
enced by the American Federation of Teachers have elicited a 
response from the less militant National Education Association, 
which now is also insisting upon joint teacher-board of education 
determination of salaries and conditions of employment. In short, 
public school teachers have had a much more extensive experience 
with collective bargaining than most other public sector occupations. 
Purpose of the Research 
The purpose of this study will be to determine some of the 
salary effects which are associated with professional negotiations in 
the public schools of Nebraska. 6 The state of Nebraska provides 
an excellent framework within which to estimate such effects. The 
fact that teacher certification requirements, public employee bar-
gaining statutes, the cost-of-living, etc., vary among states points to 
the advantage of limiting the study to a single state teacher market. 
This had been overlooked in much of the research to date. Sec-
ondly, Nebraska has an unusually large number of school districts, 
with both rural and urban influences, owing to the failure of any 
widespread consolidation attempts, and these districts represent a 
rather broad spectrum of the successes and failures of professional 
negotiations. 7 Finally, Nebraska has recently developed a some-
what unusual method of handling labor disputes in public employ-
ment through its Court of Industrial Relations. 
Organization 
Chapters 2 and 3 will provide some background information 
which will be helpful in understanding and evaluating the empiri-
cal chapters. Chapter 2 will include a very brief history of organ-
ized teacher activity, both nationally and in Nebraska. It will also 
outline and evaluate the Nebraska statutes dealing with teacher 
negotiations, including within the discussion a summary of perti-
nent decisions of the above-mentioned Court of Industrial Rela-
tions. Chapter 3 will then briefly summarize and evaluate the 
important empirical studies which have already been undertaken 
in this area. 
Chapter 4 provides evidence on the first empirical question of 
this study. An analysis of average teachers' salaries by school district 
in Nebraska from the mid-1960s on reveals a rather unusual decline 
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in the differential between average secondary salaries and average 
elementary salaries in many districts, with an equally unusual per-
sistence and even widening of such differentials in some other 
districts. Chapter 4 will constitute an attempt to explain empirically 
variations in the magnitude of this secondary-elementary differen-
tial among school districts at a point in time following the intro-
duction of Nebraska's teacher negotiation statutes. Among other 
things, it will be hypothesized that the emergence of professional 
negotiations in many Nebraska school districts in the late 1960s 
contributed to the narrowing of this differential in those districts. 
A multiple regression model will be developed in Chapter 4 to 
analyze and explain interdistrict variations in the secondary-elemen-
tary differential. 
The second empirical question, dealt with in chapter 5, con-
cerns the existence of interdistrict variations in teachers' salary 
levels at a point in time. 8 In other words, the question asked is: 
Why do some school districts pay equally qualified teachers more 
than other districts during a particular school year? A salary 
determination regression model for public schools in Nebraska will 
be developed in chapter 5 in an attempt to explain these inter-
district salary level variations. Again it will be hypothesized that, 
after other relevant variables are taken into account, teachers' 
salaries will tend to be higher in a given district for a given school 
year where professional negotiations have taken place. 
Chapters 4 and 5, then, will provide statistical estimates of the 
extent to which variations in the magnitudes of two important 
salary effects may be explained by the existence of professional 
negotiations between teachers and boards of education in Nebraska. 
Chapter 6 will draw conclusions and implications from the em-
pirical work and will point out some areas where further research 
is warranted. 
2. Historical and Legal Background 
CONSIDERATION of the historical and legal framework for teacher 
negotiations will provide an appropriate perspective for analyzing 
the impact of such negotiations upon teachers' salaries. This chap-
ter attempts to provide such a perspective. A very brief summary 
of the history of organized teacher activity, both nationally and in 
Nebraska, will be presented first. Secondly, an elaboration and 
analysis of the Nebraska teacher negotiation statutes, including 
reference to key court interpretations, will be given. 
The History of Organized Teacher Activity 
The AFT. Contrary to popular belief, teacher unionism is not a 
relatively new phenomenon. As early as 1897, the Chicago Teach-
ers Federation constituted a viable and active organization of 
teachers, and in 1902 this organization became affiliated with the 
Chicago Federation of Labor. 1 Prior to World War I at least 
twenty-one other teacher organizations in eleven states became 
affiliated with organized labor locals. 2 
Historically, two primary organizations have been active in the 
organization of teachers, the American Federation of Teachers 
(AFT) and the National Education Association (NEA). The AFT 
was formed in 1916 and soon became affiliated with the American 
Federation of Labor. It experienced sporadic but significant growth 
after its formation and by 1971 had almost 250,000 dues-paying 
members.3 Throughout its history, the AFT has emphasized and 
sought to improve the salary levels and working conditions of 
teachers. More recently, it has become actively involved in the 
organization of teachers at the college and university level. In 
Nebraska, however, the AFT has met with little success in organiz-
ing public school teachers for purposes of collective bargaining. 
Relatively unsuccessful organizational attempts have been made in 
Omaha and Lincoln, and virtually no success has been achieved in 
any other area of the state. 
The NEA. The NEA, and its state affiliate the Nebraska State 
Education Association (NSEA), has been the organizing body for 
5 
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almost all Nebraska elementary and secondary teachers. Hence, 
most of this section will be devoted to their activities. The ex-
istence of teacher organizations which were not affiliated with 
organized labor predates considerably the emergence of teacher 
unions. However, the concern of such organizations historically 
has been with the professional improvement of the teaching pro-
fession, rather than with the specific issues of remuneration and 
working conditions. In 1857 the National Teachers Association 
(NT A) became the first national organization of teachers and in 
1870 the National Association of School Superintendents and the 
American Normal School Association merged with the NT A to 
form the NEA. 4 
It was not until 1905, however, that there appears any clear 
indication of the NEA's active concern for teachers' salaries and 
working conditions. During that year, the NEA published a major 
report on teachers' salaries. This report demonstrated the need for 
substantial improvement in some areas and generated considerable 
concern within the profession. 5 However, at no time prior to 
World War II did the NEA call for any form of collective bar-
gaining, although it became progressively more vocal in its demands 
for higher teachers' salaries during the first few decades of the 
twentieth century. 6 
During the 1940s and especially after World War II a relatively 
new tactic, the strike, was adopted by several teacher organizations 
in the face of a relative decline in earnings. Some sixty-nine strikes 
occurred during the decade, fifty-seven of which took place after 
1946. And surprisingly, as many striking locals were affiliated with 
the NEA as with the AFT, although both organizations had spe-
cifically repudiated the strike as a weapon for solving disputes and 
the NEA had only just begun to accept any form of "group action" 
as a means of obtaining professional salaries. 7 Thus it appears that 
these strikes were attributable to local disenchantment rather than 
an allegiance to any particular national organization. 
By 1951, several states, including Nebraska, had enacted legisla-
tion prohibiting strikes in public employment. For instance, Sec. 
48-802-(2) of the Nebraska Public and Utility Employees Act of 
1947, as amended, states: "No right shall exist in any natural or 
corporate person or group of persons to hinder, delay, limit, or 
suspend the continuity or efficiency of any governmental service or 
governmental service in a proprietary capacity of this state, either 
by strike, lockout, or other means." 8 
Historical and Legal Background / 7 
During the 1950s the striking activity largely subsided. There 
IS no evidence of any strike involving an affiliate of the NEA be-
tween 1951 and 1963. 9 
Although, as mentioned above, the NEA enacted a policy state-
ment in 1947 encouraging group teacher action, there was very 
little intensification of these efforts by NEA affiliates in the 1950s. 
By 1961, however, a new environment had emerged. A local of the 
AFT had boycotted classes in New York City in 1960 and 1962 and 
had gained a collectively bargained agreement by July 1962. At 
the 1961 Atlantic City convention of the NEA a resolution con-
cerning teacher-board of education relations was adopted. It stated, 
in part: 
The National Education Association believes ... that professional education 
associations should be accorded the right ... to participate in the determination 
of policies of common concern including salary and other conditions for profes-
sional service .... [This participation] should preclude the arbitrary exercise 
of unilateral authority by boards of education and the use of the strike by 
teachers as a means for enforcing economic demands. 10 
The following year at the Denver convention, Resolution No. 
18 was adopted, which modified the resolution above. Instead of 
stating a belief "that professional education associations should be 
accorded the right" of participatory decision-making, the 1961 reso-
lution was reworded to state: "The National Education Association 
insists on the right of professional associations" to participate in 
decisions of common interest. This resolution also contained the 
first reference to the term professional negotiations. 11 By 1965, the 
reference to the preclusion of the use of strikes by teachers, which 
was found in the 1961 and all subsequent resolutions, was omitted, 
and in 1968 the delegation gave official support to striking affili-
ates. 12 Thus there is evidence of a rather consistent and continual 
increase in the militancy advocated by the NEA, especially since 
the emergence of a viable AFT as a competitor for membership. 
The NSEA. The Nebraska State Education Association is one of 
sixty-six state and territorial associations affiliated with the NEA. 
Strictly speaking, however, the NSEA is an independent, incorpo-
rated organization whose policies are not controlled or superseded 
by the NEA. The NSEA was originally founded in 1867 and was 
reorganized in 1922 into its present form as a corporation with 
employees. Active voting membership is open to all people engaged 
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1ll teaching or the supervision of teaching in Nebraska. The 
organization had 19,140 members during the 1972~73 school year. 13 
The NSEA's present activities consist primarily of consultation 
with local associations on negotiations and professional rights and 
responsibilities, and of lobbying during Nebraska legislative sessions 
for legislation in the interest of the teaching profession. Six full-
time men are employed to work with local associations throughout 
the state on a continuous basis. And, to a significant extent, the 
present teacher negotiation laws in Nebraska which are discussed 
in the following section owe their existence to the lobbying efforts 
of the NSEA in the mid and late 1960s. 
Nebraska Teacher Negotiation Statutes 
The Nebraska Public and Utility Employees Act. The Nebraska 
statutes dealing with teacher negotiations actually may be traced 
back to the 1947 Nebraska Public and Utility Employees Act 
mentioned earlier. Owing to an impending telephone strike, the 
1947 Unicameral passed this act with an emergency clause putting 
it immediately into effect. The act called for the formation of the 
Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), composed of five judges to 
be appointed by the governor, with the consent of the legislature. 
A six-year staggered term was established. This court was given 
the authority to settle labor disputes so as to maintain the uninter-
rupted operation of Nebraska's public utilities. The original 
statute specifically excluded employment in governmental service 
from the jurisdiction of the CIR. The establishment of the CIR, 
however, set a precedent which was conducive to the extension 
of its jurisdiction in the 1960s. 14 
By 1965, it was apparent that a need for legislation concerning 
labor relations in public employment existed. During that year 
the Nebraska Supreme Court ruled that the CIR did not have the 
jurisdiction to order bargaining between the city of Hastings and 
utility employees represented by the International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers. 15 
The Nebraska Teachers' Professional Negotiations Act. In 1967 
the Nebraska Unicameral amended the 1947 Court of Industrial 
Relations Act, as it had come to be called, so as to extend the 
jurisdiction of the CIR to governmental services rendered in a 
proprietary capacity. In this session the legislature also passed the 
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Nebraska Teachers' Professional Negotiations Act, the first labor 
legislation dealing specifically with teachers. 16 This act, submitted 
as L. B. 485, asserted the right of teachers in Class III, IV, and V 
school districts to organize for purposes of representation on matters 
of employment relations. 17 However, this statute required recogni-
tion by the school board only if a majority of the board's members 
so desired. After the teacher organization's request to the board 
to meet and confer on matters of board-employee relations, the 
statute allowed the board thirty days to accept or reject this request, 
in whole or in part, and to notify the organization in writing as 
to its decision. If the request is granted by the board, and if mutual 
agreement is reached on the terms and conditions of employment, 
the statute provides that all matters are to be reduced to writing 
and signed by representatives of both parties. Where disagreement 
on employment matters persists, provisions are made for the sub-
mission of the dispute to a fact-finding board for review and 
recommendations. Although these recommendations are to receive 
the good faith consideration of both parties, they are not binding 
upon either. If negotiations arrive at an impasse and the recom-
mendations of the fact-finding board are rejected by one or both 
parties, or if the board rejects the organization's request to negoti-
ate "in whole," the provisions of the act are considered to have 
been exhausted. 
It should be obvious that the statute was intended to be permis-
sive in nature. However, teacher organization, recognition, and 
mutual board-teacher decision-making did receive legal sanction 
through the statute and this alone constituted a significant depar-
ture from previous unilateral determination of teachers' salaries 
and conditions of employment. Beginning with the 1967-68 school 
year and continuing thereafter, local and county teachers' associa-
tions throughout Nebraska began to seek legal recognition from 
their respective school boards for purposes of collective representa-
tion on employment matters. 
L. B. 15, the 1969 Amendment. Despite the progress achieved 
under L. B. 485, obvious limitations still existed in the statutory 
framework which had been established. In 1969 a bill was intro-
duced into the Unicameral which was modeled after New York's 
Taylor Act. 18 This bill originally would have created a Public 
Employment Relations Board for Nebraska to settle disputes in-
volving governmental service. In its final form, the bill was modi-
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fied so as to utilize the existing Court of Industrial Relations 
rather than creating a new board. Thus the bill became another 
amendment to the Court of Industrial Relations Act and, after 
passage, created a method of handling public employee relations 
which had a more judicial orientation than those which existed 
in most states. 
As amended, the act covers employees of the state of Nebraska, 
political subdivisions thereof, municipal corporations, and public 
power and irrigation districts. Under the act persons, organizations, 
or school districts which are subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Nebraska Teachers' Professional Negotiations Act (L. B. 485) are 
excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations 
until all provisions of L. B. 485 are exhausted. Thus, the present 
CIR has jurisdiction over labor disputes in the above-mentioned 
public sector entities, and it may determine equitable settlements 
upon petition by employer or employee groups in these organiza-
tions. It has the power to issue summons or subpoenas, to compel 
production of documents, to make investigations, and to certify 
secret ballot representation results. Orders of the CIR are appeal-
able directly to the Nebraska Supreme Court. Finally, lockouts, 
strikes, slowdowns and other work stoppages are still illegal under 
the amended act. 19 
Summary of Present Legal Framework. For public school teachers 
in Nebraska, the present legal procedures may be summarized as 
follows. Under L. B. 485, all teachers in Class III, IV, and V 
districts have the right to organize, where such organizations have 
the right to represent their members in matters of employment 
relations with local school boards. Following a request by the 
organization to the school board to meet and confer, the board 
may accept or reject the request in whole or in part. If the board 
rejects the request in whole, the provisions of L. B. 485 are 
exhausted and the teacher organization may invoke the jurisdiction 
of the CIR under the 1947 act, as amended in 1969. If the board 
accepts the request to meet and confer, in part or in whole, then 
negotiations proceed and a fact-finding board may be convened in 
the case of impasse. If the recommendations of the fact-finding 
board are rejected by one or both parties, the provisions of L. B. 
485 are again exhausted and either party may take the dispute to 
the CIR for settlement. If agreement is reached at any stage in 
the process, all matters are to be reduced to writing and signed 
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by members of both parties. In practice, this last provision of a 
signed master contract has often been overlooked by the disputants. 
The status of Class 1, II, and VI school districts is somewhat 
less certain. Since these districts are not covered by L. B. 485, but 
since they are political subdivisions of the state of Nebraska as 
provided in L. B. 15, the present interpretation is that they fall 
directly under the jurisdiction of the CIR as stipulated in the 
1947 act as amended. This is a less than ideal status for these 
districts, however, in that there are no provisions for formal recog-
nition, impasse, fact-finding, etc., to which they are subject. To 
date, the existence of formal negotiations in these districts is fairly 
uncommon. 
Key Court Interpretations 
CIR Salary-Setting Authority. With respect to the negotiations laws, 
perhaps the key element in the Nebraska statutory framework was 
the establishment of salary-setting authority with the CIR, a highly 
unusual ceding of budgetary power. Section 48-818 of the Nebraska 
Public and Utility Employees Act, as amended in 1969, contains 
the provisions setting forth the salary-setting authority of the Court. 
The finding and order or orders may establish or alter the scale of wages, 
hours of labor, or conditions of employment, or anyone or more of the same. 
In making such findings and order or orders, the Court of Industrial Relations 
shall establish rates of pay and conditions of employment which are compar-
able to the prevalent wage rates paid and conditions of employment maintained 
for the same or similar skills under the same or similar working conditions. In 
establishing wage rates the court shall take into consideration the overall com-
pensation presently received by the employees, having regard not only to wages 
for time actually worked, but also wages for time not worked, including vacation, 
holidays, and other excused time, and all benefits received, including insurance 
and pensions, and the continuity and stability of employment enjoyed by the 
employees. 20 
Thus the Court is authorized to make salary and conditions of 
employment settlements, when petitioned to do so under the provi-
sions of the act, which are in accordance with standards of com-
parability with similar work, workers, and conditions. Not unex-
pectedly, the interpretation of comparability and the determination 
of similar work, workers, and conditions have been the sources of 
continuing controversy in recent key Court decisions. 
The Milford Case. In the Milford case,21 the CIR rejected the 
petition filed by the Milford Education Association on the grounds 
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that the over-all compensation in the salary schedule proposed by 
the school board was comparable to the present wages paid in other 
similar districts. The teachers' association was asking for only a 
$100 increase in the base pay, index increments for every nine 
hours of additional course work instead of twelve, and $11 per 
month instead of $10 for health and accident insurance. The CIR 
defined twenty-nine school districts as being comparable to Mil-
ford's, primarily on the basis of student enrollment, and found that 
only one of these twenty-nine districts provided over-all compensa-
tion greater than that set by the Milford school board. 
The Weeping Water Case. Again in the Weeping Water case, 22 
the petition of the plaintiff teachers' association was rejected by 
the Court as it was determined that the salary schedule adopted 
by the school board met the statutory criteria. Here the CIR noted 
that the parties had been negotiating for several months and that 
agreement had been reached on all matters except base salary. The 
ruling argued that consideration should be given to the history of 
the negotiations and the litigation between the parties, and that 
the burden was on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the provisions 
of the statute had not been complied with. 
The Seward Case. Perhaps the most significant case to come before 
the CIR was the 1971 dispute in the Seward, Nebraska, school dis-
trict. 23 At issue here was not only a disagreement between the dis-
putants with respect to salaries and conditions of employment. Two 
broader issues also came under consideration, namely the legitimacy 
and necessity of an index salary schedule and the legality of the 
salary-setting authority of the CIR. The Seward school board argued 
that the imposition of a uniform index salary schedule infringed 
upon the rights of the school district and was discriminatory against 
beginning teachers. The Court concluded: 
We do not hold or infer that an index salary schedule may be required in 
all cases. Our decision in this case is based on the evidence in the record that 
an index salary will, in this instance, establish comparable rates of pay and 
will effectuate the purposes of Chapter 48, Article 8.24 
Of even more significance was the school district's argument that 
the salary-setting authority of the Court was negated by Sec. 
48-810.01 of the Court of Industrial Relations Act, which states: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, the State of Nebraska and 
any other political or governmental subdivision thereof cannot be compelled 
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to enter into any contract or agreement, written or otherwise, with any labor 
organization concerning grievances, labor disputes, rates of pay, hours of em-
ployment or conditions of work. 25 
The Court ruled, however, that its order was not a contract 
or agreement and that acceptance of the Seward district's conten-
tions would nullify the authority granted to the Court in Sec. 
48-818 of the act. The ruling of the Court was appealed to the 
Nebraska Supreme Court and on 12 July, 1972 the Supreme Court 
affirmed four to three the CIR order. 26 
Thus by the summer of 1972 the statutory framework which 
recognized the legitimacy of bilateral determination of teachers' 
salaries and conditions of employment was firmly established in 
Nebraska. The effects of such negotiations were presumably being 
felt prior to this time, however, owing to the existence of formal 
professional negotiations in many districts in the late 1960s. And 
Nebraska teachers have experienced a modest, although not insig-
nificant, improvement in salaries relative to other states during 
the general period in question. During the 1966-67 school year, 
the estimated average classroom teacher salary in Nebraska was 
$5,619 whereas the national average was $6,821. The Nebraska 
salary figure ranked forty-first nationally for 1966-67. By the 
1972-73 school year, the corresponding figures were $8,730 for 
Nebraska and $10,460 nationally. Although still well below the 
national average, Nebraska had improved its rank to thirty-fourth 
by this time. 27 Of course, these figures, by themselves, provide no 
evidence of a relationship between the emergence of professional 
negotiations and the indicated relative salary improvement of 
Nebraska's teachers. Before turning to the empirical question of the 
magnitude of any salary effects associated with professional nego-
tiations in Nebraska, chapter 3 will be devoted to a brief summary 
and evaluation of related empirical studies which have attempted 
to determine various economic effects associated with such nego-
tiations. 
3. Prior Empirical Work 
A S INDICATED EARLIER, the emergence of professional negotiations 
for public school teachers is a recent phenomenon. It has only been 
during the last eight to ten years that such negotiations have 
occurred within a legitimate legal environment. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, meaningful empirical research attempting to determine 
the economic effects of such negotiations is of an even more recent 
vintage. This chapter will briefly survey and evaluate a relatively 
limited number of studies which deal with these issues. I will con-
clude by summarizing some general shortcomings of the existing 
work, so as to provide a convenient perspective for the empirical 
extensions of chapters 4 and 5. 
The Rehmus-Wilner Study 
In a 1968 University of Michigan monograph, Charles Rehmus 
and Evan Wilner examined a sample of twelve Michigan school dis-
tricts within which professional negotiations had begun in 1966-67. 1 
They estimated the average annual percentage changes in B.A. 
minimum and M.A. maximum salary levels for these districts for 
the years from 1961 to 1968. They found that the average annual 
percentage increase in B.A. minimum salaries from 1961 to 1966 
was 2.8%, whereas from 1966 to 1968 it jumped to 8.5%. Much 
the same pattern was observed for the average annual percentage 
increases in M.A. maximum salary levels-3.5% annually prior to 
1966 and 10.5% thereafter. Rehmus and Wilner concluded that 
negotiations had produced salary increases nearly three times higher 
than they would have been in the absence of such negotiations. 
Of course, this study is subject to important limitations which 
cast suspicion upon their conclusion. It is quite possible that other 
factors could have caused the significant salary increases after 1965. 
The authors made no attempt to derive a differential or relative 
salary effect attributable to negotiations. The sample size was 
severely limited, casting doubt on the external validity of the 
results. The techniques employed do not allow for the assignment 
of levels of statistical significance to the results. Finally, there is 
considerable evidence that the years 1965-67 were ones of very rapid 
increases in salary levels for both organized and unorganized teach-
15 
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ers.2 Fortunately, somewhat more precise and meaningful statistical 
techniques have been used in more recent studies. 
The Thornton Study 
One of the more comprehensive studies was completed in 1970 
by Robert Thornton. 3 Thornton employed a least-squares multiple 
regression model with minimum and maximum B.A. and M.A. 
salary levels as alternative dependent variables and a negotiating-
nonnegotiating dummy variable as one of the independent vari-
ables. Utilizing 1969 cross-sectional data from eighty-three school 
districts across the nation which were located in cities of at least 
100,000 population, as well as negotiations data from a Brookings 
Institution questionnaire, Thornton formulated a separate regres-
sion equation for each of the alternative salary specifications. The 
coefficients of the negotiation variable were all of the expected 
positive sign and were all statistically significant. The corresponding 
salary differentials ranged from $160 at the M.A. minimum level 
to $3,132 for the M.A. maximum, or in relative terms, from 2.3% 
to 28.8%. After adjustments for spurious correlation, Thornton 
concluded that professional negotiations had raised teachers' sal-
aries above those in nonnegotiating districts by from 1 % to 4% 
at the three lower salary steps to 23% at the M.A. maximum level. 
Although the Thornton study constitutes a significant improve-
ment over previous work, certain weaknesses remain. The coeffi-
cient of determination for the M.A. maximum regression drops to 
.07, which leaves one with diminished confidence in the explanatory 
power of this specification. Once again, the external validity of 
the study may be questioned due to Thornton's consideration of 
only larger city school districts. Finally, the multi state nature of 
the sample presents problems. As mentioned at the outset, many 
rf'levant factors are variable among different state teacher markets, 
and disregard for these variations may cause errors in the estimation 
of the effects of teacher negotiations. 
The Kasper Study 
A study which has received considerably more cntICISm than 
the Thornton work was published in 1970 by Hirschel Kasper. 4 
Kasper attempted to estimate the effects of negotiations on average 
state-wide teacher salaries for the 1967-68 school year, using state 
per capita income, extent of urbanization, support from state reve-
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nues, expenditures per pupil, and the strength of teacher organiza-
tion as primary independent variables in his model. Data were 
gathered from state sources and from AFT and NEA headquarters. 
Several alternative measures of both salaries and organizational 
strength were used and both single equation and two-stage least-
squares estimates were obtained. In the single equation form, Kasper 
found no significant salary effect related to teacher bargaining 
strength. The two-stage estimates showed a significant effect attrib-
utable to negotiations of no more than 4%. 
Both conceptual and statistical problems exist in the study. 
Teacher negotiations typically occur at the local school district 
level, not on a state-wide level. No interdistrict, intrastate compari-
sons were made in the study and no index of local bargaining 
strength was employed. Misspecification of the organizational 
strength variable was another limitation. Kasper's primary organi-
zational strength variable was obtained by summing the number of 
instructional personnel represented in local district negotiations 
and dividing that number by the total number of classroom teach-
ers in the state. Instructional personnel was defined so as to include 
principals, supervisors, librarians, etc., who are usually not covered 
under a negotiated agreement. This variable is also defined very 
broadly so as to include everything from the simplest recognition 
agreement to formal negotiations. Finally, both Kasper and Thorn-
ton hypothesize a positive relationship between teacher salaries 
and the presence of negotiations, yet each performs a two-tailed 
significance test of the regression coefficient. 
The Landon-Baird Study 
In 1972, John Landon and Robert Baird published a modified 
version of an earlier study which was designed specifically to over-
come the weaknesses of the Kasper and Thornton studies. 5 The 
authors collected data from forty-four school districts of 25,000 to 
50,000 enrollment. These data contained information on member-
ship in teacher organizations and on bargaining arrangements in 
these districts. Using multiple regression equations similar to those 
of Kasper and Thornton, with beginning teachers' salaries as the 
dependent variable, they employed three different specifications for 
the teacher organization variable. These were: (1) a dummy form 
similar to Thornton's, (2) the percentage of teachers in a district 
who were members of the NEA, and (3) the percentage of teachers 
who were members of the AFT. With the first specification, Landon 
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and Baird found that salaries tended to be significantly higher in 
negotiating districts, by 4.9% or $251.17 on the average. With the 
NEA variable, the coefficient was positive but of lesser significance 
than the dummy variable coefficient. The AFT coefficient became 
negative and insignificant. 
Unfortunately, there are also some problems inherent in the 
Landon-Baird analysis. They seem to fall into the same potential 
trap as did Thornton in considering only large school districts. 
And although they are critical of both the Thornton and the 
Kasper specifications of the negotiation variable, their alternatives 
appear to offer little improvement. Their first specification is essen-
tially the same as Thornton's and it provides the most significant 
results. The percentage of teachers who are members of the NEA 
may not meaningfully indicate bargaining power. In many states 
in the late 1960s, including Nebraska, unified membership in a 
local association, the state NEA affiliate, and the NEA was not 
required. Thus teachers in a given school district might be actively 
engaged in negotiations while having no members in the NEA. 
Alternatively, a district might have 100% NEA membership and 
yet not be negotiating at all. And the AFT variable is clearly inap-
propriate, as the authors admit, in that the local membership in 
the AFT averaged only about 10% in their sample. Finally, Landon 
and Baird's use of beginning teachers' salaries as the sole dependent 
variable is questionable. Several authors have argued that beginning 
salaries are still largely set by market forces and that the real 
opportunity to utilize bargaining power comes at the B.A. maxi-
mum, M.A. minimum, and M.A. maximum steps. 6 
The Frey Study 
A study with perhaps the most advanced theoretical base de-
veloped to date was undertaken by Donald Frey in his doctoral 
dissertation completed at Princeton University in 1972. 7 His model 
used both base pay and maximum pay as dependent variables. Both 
cross-sectional and pooled data from 298 New Jersey school dis-
tricts were utilized. The sample was limited to those districts which 
had at least 750 pupils enrolled. The cross-sectional results revealed 
no significant effect on either base payor maximum pay associated 
with teacher negotiations. For the pooled regressions, the study 
indicated that negotiations may have raised the base pay from 0.4% 
to 2% in negotiating districts. However, the impact of negotiations 
on maximum pay was either insignificant or negative. 
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Frey's study is in many ways superior to previous work, primarily 
because he recognizes the importance of limiting the analysis to a 
single state teacher market. Some shortcomings remain, however. 
As in previous studies, Frey restricts his sample to relatively large 
school districts, although this restriction is not nearly so severe as, 
for instance, in the Landon-Baird study. Nevertheless, almost one 
half of the school districts in New Jersey were omitted. 
Secondly, the New Jersey Labor Mediation Act was amended in 
1968 to create a Public Employment Relations Commission. Thus 
the first year that results of formal bargaining could have been 
observed was the 1969-70 school year, the last year which Frey 
considers in his study. Although Frey discounts this possibility, it 
may be that this first year was a transitional one wherein the full 
impact of formal negotiations had not yet been felt. 
Thirdly, Frey uses a dummy variable for professional negotia-
tions which takes the value of one for districts with contracts on 
file with the Public Employment Relations Commission for the 
1969-70 school year, and zero otherwise. As he admits, this may 
be a poor indicator of the extent of negotiations. Especially during 
the first full year of the amended act's existence, many schools could 
have conceivably failed to file such contracts. Or alternatively, mean-
ingful negotiations may have been occurring in many districts 
without culminating in a formal contract. 
Finally, although Frey considers the effects of negotiations on 
both base pay and maximum pay, his conception of maximum pay 
is unclear. He defines maximum pay as "base pay plus the exper-
ience increment times the number of steps on the salary schedule." 8 
In terms of the salary schedule presented in Appendix A of this 
study, Frey's maximum pay would presumably be equivalent to the 
base salary +0.06 x 12 years, or 1.72 times the base salary. This con-
ception of maximum pay appears to ignore all horizontal increments 
in salary which may be gained through acquiring additional col-
lege credits beyond the B.A. degree. It is obvious from Appendix A 
that this specification of maximum pay may seriously understate 
the true maximum salary attainable and the impact of negotiations 
upon that maximum. 
The Hall-Carroll Study 
A more geographically limited study was published in early 
1973 by W. Clayton Hall and Norman Carroll. 9 They attempted 
to estimate the effects of professional negotiations on both salaries 
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and class size, using data from 118 elementary school districts III 
suburban Cook County, Illinois, for the 1968-69 school year. Using 
two alternative salary models, one of which was similar to Kasper's 
formulation, the authors found a salary effect attributable to nego-
tiations of roughly $165 to $200. Curiously, they also found that 
the existence of negotiated contracts tended to increase the student-
teacher ratio by about 1.3 students per teacher. Thus, it appears 
that school boards may be offering organized teachers higher salaries, 
but only in exchange for larger classes. 
The study is a further improvement in several respects, suffer-
ing only in that its methodological explanations are sometimes in-
adequate or unclear. The limited geographical sample in the study 
eliminates the aggregation problems of many of the previous studies. 
However, the authors' specification of the variables used is impre-
cise, and they give no specific reason for their consideration of only 
elementary districts. 
The Schoenberger Study 
Finally, a recently completed doctoral dissertation by R. E. 
Schoenberger at Clark University adds more evidence to the ques-
tions at hand. 10 For the state of Wisconsin, Schoenberger attempted 
to measure both the effects of teacher negotiations and of school 
district monopsony power on teachers' salaries. Strictly speaking, 
a monopsony labor market is one wherein there is only one em-
ployer of a given type of labor, although operationally monopsony 
power may exist where any small number of employers exert signifi-
cant wage-setting power. Economic theory suggests that where 
monopsony power is predominant, wages will be established at levels 
lower than those which would exist in the absence of such power. 
For teachers, monopsony forces may exist where there are few geo-
graphically proximate school districts competing for teachers' 
services. 
Schoenberger's cross-sectional study covered the school years 
1969-70, 1970-71, and 1971-72 and examined 309 of the 368 K-12 
school districts in Wisconsin. Utilizing a functional formulation 
similar to previous studies, he found that teacher negotiations in 
Wisconsin accounted for salary differentials of about 3% on the 
average. Schoenberger also found significant negative salary effects 
attributable to monopsony school board power as measured by the 
geographic size of the school district. 
Prior Empirical Work / 21 
\ 
This study is relatively free of most of the earlier conceptual 
and statistical problems. Although Schoenberger does observe some 
problems of multicollinearity in his regression model once a vari-
able for urbanization is included, this does not negate his findings. 
There are, however, several states which have not yet experienced 
widespread school district consolidation, as has Wisconsin, and for 
which a monopsony variable would seemingly be inappropriate. As 
mentioned earlier, no such widespread consolidation has occurred 
in Nebraska. 
Summary 
It should be obvious from the brief survey presented here that 
meaningful research into the subject of the salary effects of profes-
sional negotiations has already been undertaken. Furthermore, 
many of the conceptual and methodological weaknesses of earlier 
studies are being eliminated. Yet consistency of the findings is still 
somewhat lacking. On a pessimistic note, Kasper has observed: 
All alternative approaches to the broad question of the effect of representa-
tion on wages in the public sector currently deserve the presumption of being 
a "contribution" because (a) our knowledge of the effects in the public sector 
is negligible, if not non-existent, however firm our impressions of private sector 
effects; (b) the nature or style of representation in the public sector is quite 
different from that in the private sector; (c) the public (nonfederal) sector is 
large and expanding; and (d) collective representation within it is relatively 
new and of increasing frequency. 11 
More optimistically, all the studies to date indicate a relative 
salary effect associated with professional negotiations ranging from 
o to 5%. And, in some cases, the differences within this range are 
more of interpretation than of magnitude. Baird and Landon find a 
4.9% relative salary effect to be a substantial influence, whereas 
Kasper attaches "little, if any" significance to a 4% effect. Perhaps, 
as Kasper has suggested, "Teachers will be less incJined to quibble 
about this difference than economists." 12 
Nevertheless, some general shortcomings of the existing studies 
may be listed. Only two of the studies, the Frey and Schoenberger 
contributions, employ precise statistical techniques while limiting 
the analysis to the most significant population, a state teacher 
market. Use of aggregate data in the other studies may merely imply 
that part of the observed impact of professional negotiations on 
teachers' salary levels was actually attributable to other interstate 
or interregional influences. Furthermore, there is a general incon-
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sistency in the studies with respect to the specifications of the nego-
tiations and salary variables. These inconsistencies will be given 
further attention in chapters 4 and 5. Also, the samples of the 
studies tend to be primarily urban in nature, and this may again 
bias the results. Finally, all of the studies are concerned only with 
the impact of professional negotiations upon relative salary levels 
between organized and unorganized teacher groups. This impact 
is expressed as an inter-school district or interregional effect. It is 
also possible, however, that negotiations have had an impact upon 
the internal salary structure of a given school district, and specifi-
cally upon the secondary-elementary salary differential. The follow-
ing chapter is devoted to consideration of this intra-school district 
effect of professional negotiations. 
4. Professional Negotiations and the 
Secondary -Elementary Salary Differential 
HISTORICALLY, the average salary levels of secondary teachers in 
the United States have consistently been higher than those of ele-
mentary teachers. Although these secondary-elementary salary differ-
entials may be partially explained by differences in education and 
experience, there has also been a tendency to view secondary teach-
ing and elementary teaching as two distinct types of occupations, 
varying in difficulty and in importance, and requiring "equalizing 
differences" in compensation. As two noted authors on the subject 
contend, "For a long time it was felt that elementary school teach-
ing was both less difficult and less important than high school 
teaching, and this was considered justification for paying high 
school teachers more." 1 
There is considerable evidence, however, that this view is chang-
ing or has changed in most school systems, and that secondary-ele-
mentary salary differentials are declining. 2 Although several plaus-
ible reasons exist for this changing view, perhaps the most signifi-
cant causal factor has been the emergence of organized teacher 
groups and their insistence upon the use of uniform single salary 
schedules for salary determination purposes. This chapter will 
briefly explore the rationale which organized labor groups in 60th 
the private and public sectors have used in attempting to achieve 
uniform salaries. The major portion of the chapter will then 
attempt to derive empirically the magnitude and direction of the 
effect which organized teacher activities have had upon the sec-
ondary-elementary salary differential in the Nebraska public schools. 
The Private Sector Experience 
It has long been a goal of trade unionism in the private sector 
to impose uniform, industry-wide wage policies. "Unions in highly 
competitive industries, especially those for which wages are a large 
part of the cost of production, will almost always pursue a standard 
wage policy within a given product market. They set uniform time 
rates or piece rates for all firms so as 'to take labor out of competi-
tion.' " 3 
23 
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With respect to the internal wage structure of the firm, this 
standard wage policy typically takes the form of a union contract 
or other type of collective agreement whereby uniform procedures 
are applied to all workers in a group, and where such procedures 
can be changed only at fixed time intervals after negotiations with 
the union. 
The processes by which these agreements are negotiated, administered, and 
enforced are included in the term "collective bargaining." The word "collective" 
indicates that the agreement is negotiated on behalf of a group of workers. 
The workers present a united front to their employer, and the terms of the 
bargain apply uniformly to all members of the group. 4 
The rationale for such a wage policy of collective uniformity 
apparently lies in the belief that the potentiial for wage injustices 
is substantial in the absence of such policies, especially given the 
existence of some monopsony power. This view is clearly evident 
in the following description by two union officials of the wage 
inequity problems of the preunion steel industry. 
Of all the chickens unions stir up during the organizing stage, none comes 
home to roost with a louder crow than the wage inequality one .... Until 
SWOC [Steel Workers Organizing Committee] won the first collective bargaining 
contracts its research department functioned almost exclusively as an agent 
to ferret out wage inequalities within plants and between plants. . . . Loud 
speakers blared at the mill gates, "Who said a craneman is worth twenty 
cents more in Pittsburgh than in Chicago? . . . How about your mill? Is a 
millwright in the blooming mill worth eighteen cents more than a millwright 
in the electric furnace department? No! ... join the union and bring justice 
to all workers!"5 
Thus the trade union in the private sector has attempted par-
tially to supplant the purely economic forces of wage determina 
tion and substitute for these such criteria as "justice" and "equal 
pay for equal work." 
Worker protest against the competitive market concept of the employment 
relationship is one of the foundation stones upon which the institution of trade 
unionism in the United States has been erected. It is of the essence of trade 
union wage policy that wage rates be judged in relation to such non·economic 
criteria as "fairness" and "equity" and to seek to establish wage relationships 
that can be rationalized in terms of these non·market values. 6 
The effects of such a standard union wage policy upon the 
general wage structure in the United States are far from conclusive. 
With respect to the intraindustry wage structure, however, the 
evidence seems to support an initial narrowing of wage differentials, 
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although this narrowing may not continue over time. In their well-
known study of the wage structure in the United States, Lloyd 
Reynolds and Cynthia Taft conclude: "The effect of union efforts 
to reduce wage differentials among rival producers appears to be 
moderately favorable-not so completely beneficial as unions some-
times allege, but sufficiently so to warrant a positive score for 
collective bargaining." 7 
And to the extent that trade unions have been successful in 
negotiating a uniform wage package with an employer, the effect 
upon the internal wage structure of the firm seems clearly to have 
been a narrowing or elimination of any pre-existing intraoccupa-
tional wage differentials. 
The Public Sector Teacher Market 
The Structure of Teacher Compensation. In most school districts, 
a number of factors exist which might explain salary differentials 
among teachers. Most of these factors are especially significant 
in explaining secondary-elementary differentials. 
Perha ps the most significant factors in explaining teacher salary 
determination are experience and training. It is generally felt that 
teachers become more effective and productive as additional class-
room experience is acquired. Training may be considered a determi-
nant in several ways. Teachers will presumably be more effective 
in the classroom if they are sufficiently educated in terms of college 
preparation in education-related courses and in courses dealing 
with the subject matter which they teach. Secondly, teacher salaries 
may be viewed partially as compensation for the costs incurred in 
acquiring a sufficient education for teaching purposes. This second 
factor is not as important today in that the costs of a four-year 
teacher-training program do not vary significantly among colleges, 
at least in public institutions. 8 However, teachers may be given 
additional compensation for college work beyond, say, the B.A. 
degree. This additional compensation may be viewed either in 
terms of productivity enhancement or in terms of cost compensation. 
To the extent that educational levels or experience levels differ 
among teachers in a given district, salary differentials can be 
expected. 
Teachers are also usually given additional compensation for 
assuming duties of an extracurricular nature such as coaching, club 
sponsorship, and the like. The existence of these extra duties in a 
school district provides further justification for salary differentials. 
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It is certainly also probable that market forces have some influ-
ence upon intradistrict salary differentials, although there is dis-
agreement upon the significance of such forces. Wellington and 
Winter contend that "in the public sector, too, the market operates. 
In the long run, the supply of labor is a function of the price paid 
for labor by the public employer relative to what workers earn 
elsewhere." 9 
However, two noted experts on teacher markets argue: 
Sometimes market forces are recognized but usually in a sub rosa fashion, and 
they are regarded as a temporary disturbance which will go away soon. In the 
literature on teacher salaries the terms supply and demand appear frequently 
enough, but almost always in a quite mechanistic way .... But rarely is atten-
tion given to the competing demands for teachers. 10 
Although one can quibble about the extent to which market 
forces operate, there is ample evidence to suggest that such forces 
have been considered by school officials in establishing the structure 
of compensation. During a period of relative teacher shortages 
such as the first three-fourths of the 1960s, it was not unusual to 
find additional compensation being offered by school systems to 
teachers whose training was in areas of crucial shortage such as 
special education, music, mathematics, etc. As Charles Perry and 
Wesley Wildman have observed: 
In the absence of collective bargaining, . . . differentials were set in the 
interests of minimizing recruiting problems and turnover. [A school system 
maintains] a compensation structure which enables it to recruit individuals 
from inside and outside the system into the various positions within the organiza-
tion and to retain those individuals. 11 
Another factor which may contribute to salary differentials 
within a school system is employer monopsony power. Even where 
school district monopsony power may be insufficient to have an 
impact on the general level of compensation in a district, this 
power may affect the structure of compensation. School districts may 
limit the differentials which would otherwise be justified for particu-
lar teachers in the system because such teachers might be particu-
larly susceptible to any monopsony power which may exist. For 
instance, young, unmarried males have much more labor market 
mobility than do older, married female teachers. The lack of mo-
bility of this latter group makes them more vulnerable to any 
existing monopsony power. Intensifying this vulnerability is the 
likelihood that most of these teachers would tend to be secondary 
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wage earners. In short, the supply of this group of teachers is rela-
tively inelastic. 12 
It is not unreasonable to suspect that a disproportionate num-
ber of teachers possessing these vulnerable characteristics would 
be elementary teachers. The vast majority of elementary teachers 
in the United States are secondary wage-earning married females 
who are locked in to the narrow geographic market surrounding 
their husband's employment location. 
Finally, the feeling may persist in some unprogressive school 
districts that secondary teaching requires greater compensation 
than elementary teaching for reasons not mentioned earlier. In 
addition to the misconception that secondary teaching requires more 
skill, it is sometimes argued that secondary teachers must be more 
specialized in their academic training. Compensation should then 
reflect the increased burden assumed in acquiring this specializa-
tion. Also the view is often expressed that secondary teachers must 
deal with more serious discipline problems and that they should 
be reimbursed for this disamenity. 
Although the logic of some of the rationale presented above 
may be questionable, many of these reasons have been effectively 
used to justify salary differentials between secondary and elementary 
teachers. Elementary teachers would seem to be more susceptible to 
the internal exercise of school board monopsony power and, to the 
extent that such beliefs still exist, they suffer further from the view 
that elementary teaching requires less skill or competence. 
Professional Negotiations and the Uniform Salary Schedule. As in 
the private sector, organized teacher groups have for some time 
been concerned with the salary inequality issue. Prior to organized 
activity, teachers'salaries were established on the basis of an indi-
vidual agreement between a teacher and the school board. As the 
dissatisfaction with this type of arrangement became more wide-
spread, a movement led by the NEA began which favored the adop-
tion of some type of schedule which would make the salary-setting 
process less arbitrary. An education historian, Hazel Davis, has 
observed: "Payment of teachers' salaries according to a dependable 
schedule rather than on the basis of individual bargaining has long 
been recognized as important to the security and dignity of the 
teaching profession." 13 
The first type of schedule which became popular was the posi-
tion type schedule. "In this type of schedule the school board 
would establish a salary for each position in the school. ... Typi-
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cally the salaries differed from grade to grade, and high school 
salaries would almost invariably be higher than those at the ele-
mentary level." 14 Altho,Ugh this type of schedule removed much 
of the uncertainty and arbitrariness which had earlier typified 
teacher salary determination, it certainly did little to remove the 
inequities associated with secondary-elementary salary differentials. 
Coincident with the more recent movement toward teacher 
organization has been the widespread adoption of the type of 
schedule found in Appendix A, which is commonly called the 
single salary schedule. "The distinguishing characteristic of the 
single salary schedule is that the salary class to which a classroom 
teacher is assigned depends on the professional qualifications of the 
teacher rather than the school level or assignment." 15 
As the schedule in Appendix A indicates, the term professional 
qualifications is defined in terms of the college training which a 
teacher has acquired and the number of years of classroom teach-
ing experience which he or she possesses. Many of the earlier dis-
putes over salary inequalities centered on the school board's con-
tention that different classes of teachers differed in "value" to the 
school district. Hence, secondary teachers received greater compen-
sation as a group than did elementary teachers, mathematics teach-
ers received more than physical education teachers, etc. As teachers 
developed a collective voice and began arguing for implementation 
of single salary schedules,. these "value" distinctions have tended 
to disappear in many school systems. "The single salary schedule 
was regarded as bringing a feeling of contentment and professional-
ism. A teacher would no longer be an elementary teacher, but a 
teacher, a member on equal footing of the profession that now 
included all teachers." 16 
The parallel with the private sector should be obvious. The 
organized activities of teachers have included demands for salary 
standardization which are similar to the earlier demands made by 
private sector trade unions. And just as the evidence in the private 
sector supports the belief that collective bargaining has led to 
an initial narrowing of intraindustry and intraoccupational wage 
differentials, a similar narrowing of such differentials should be 
expected in the public sector teacher market. The following sections 
of this chapter are devoted to the development and use of a mul-
tiple regression model to test this expectation with respect to the 
secondary-elementary salary differential in the Nebraska public 
schools. 
The Secondary-Elementary Salary Differential / 29 
The Regression Model 
Most of the variables which may significantly affect the mag-
nitude of secondary-elementary salary differentials in a particular 
school district have already been discussed in previous sections. 
For the purposes of the model which will be developed here, the 
following variables deserve reconsideration. Years of teaching exper-
ience was previously indicated as a primary determinant of teach-
ers' salaries. In a given school district, for example, if secondary 
teachers have accumulated a large number of collective years of 
experience while the elementary teachers as a group are relatively 
inexperienced, one would expect the average secondary-average 
elementary salary differential to be fairly large, other things remain-
ing constant. 
Secondly, the training or education of teachers should be a sig-
nificant determinant of teacher salaries. In those districts where 
the educational attainment of secondary teachers on the average 
exceeds substantially that of elementary teachers, a relatively large 
average secondary-average elementary salary differential would be 
expected, ceteris paribus. 
Third, the extent to which the teaching staff, and especially 
the elementary teaching staff, is composed of immobile, secondary 
wage earners should affect the magnitude of the differential. As 
indicated earlier, a school board may be able to exercise some 
monopsony power over the salaries of such teachers, even in the 
absence of any power to do so for all teachers in the system. Thus, 
for instance, in those districts where the elementary teaching staff 
is composed overwhelmingly of married females, the secondary-
elementary differential might conceivably be larger than in the 
absence of such a situation. 
Another factor alluded to earlier was the extra compensation 
paid for assuming extracurricular duties. Unfortunately, little reli-
able data exist for Nebraska on this type of compensation by ele-
mentary and secondary responsibilities. A priori, it would be ex-
pected that more opportunities for such extra compensation would 
be available at the secondary level. Since this expectation cannot 
be supported by available data, however, and since the additional 
duties at the secondary level may in some cases be assumed by 
elementary teachers, this variable was omitted from the model. 
The significance of market forces was also mentioned previously, 
specifically with respect to teacher shortages in particular subject 
matter areas. This is another variable which is difficult to specify 
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operationally. Furthermore, the period of time which will be the 
central concern of this study is the 1970-71 school year. By this 
time, the teacher shortages which were projected in the early 1960s 
had virtually disappeared in Nebraska and nationally. For these 
reasons, this variable was also omitted from the analysis. 
Finally, the central hypothesis running through this chapter 
has been that formal professional negotiations between teachers 
and boards of education will tend to narrow salary differentials. 
It will be expected, therefore, that where professional negotiations 
are occurring, secondary-elementary salary differentials will be 
smaller than in nonnegotiating districts. 
Assuming linear relationships and temporarily ignoring signs, 
the model may be summarized symbolically in the following regres-
sion equation form: 
D = a + bE. + cEe + dTs + eTe + fS + gN + u 
where: 
D average secondary-average elementary salary differential for 
a given school district 
Es teaching experience of secondary teachers in a given school 
district 
Ee teaching experience of elementary teachers in a given district 
Ts training or education of secondary teachers in a given district 
Te = training or education of elementary teachers in a given dis-
trict 
S secondary wage earner or immobility variable for a given 
district 
N 1= the presence of formal negotiations in a given district 
u - random error term 
Based upon the previous discussion of this chapter, it should 
be apparent that positive signs are hypothesized for the regression 
coefficients of the secondary experience (Es), secondary training 
(Ts), and secondary wage earner (S) variables. Negative signs are 
expected for the elementary experience (Ee), elementary training 
(Te) , and negotiations (N) variables. 
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The Sample 
The sample consisted of 201 of Nebraska's 304 school districts 
which operate schools providing education from kindergarten 
through the twelfth grade (K-12 districts). The large number of 
Nebraska school districts which are K-6, K-8, 7-12, or 9-12 districts 
were omitted for the obvious reason that no secondary-elementary 
comparisons could be made in these districts. For the 103 K-12 dis-
tricts which were omitted, no reliable negotiations data were avail-
able. The sample selection process did not seem to seriously bias 
the sample. It includes 60 of Nebraska's 98 Class II school districts 
and 141 of the state's 206 Class III, IV, and V districts. 17 The 
inclusion of numerous small rural districts in this sample provided 
an urban-rural balance which has not been evident in most of 
the previous work in this general subject area. 
The 1970-71 school year was selected for primary analysis in 
the study. As indicated in chapter 2, the legal right of teachers 
to formally negotiate salaries and conditions of employment with 
their employers had been firmly established in Nebraska by this 
time. Both the 1967 Teachers' Professional Negotiations Act and 
the 1969 amendment to the Court of Industrial Relations Act had 
been enacted and implemented in a large number of Nebraska 
school districts. Yet this school year was early enough in the Ne-
braska teacher organization movement so that unilateral school 
board salary determination was still the rule in many districts. 
Hence, a valid comparison between negotiating and nonnegotiating 
districts was possible. 
Specification of the Variables 
Ordinary least-squares multiple regression analysis was used for 
the cross-sectional data to estimate the simultaneous effects of the 
hypothesized variables upon the secondary-elementary salary differ-
ential. The dependent variable (D) was specified as the mean sec-
ondary salary in a given district minus the mean elementary salary 
in that district for the 1970-71 school year. The Nebraska Depart-
ment of Education annually publishes the Nebraska Educational 
Directory which contains average secondary and average elementary 
salaries by district, as computed from data submitted by each dis-
trict. The differentials were calculated from these data. 
The variable for secondary experience was specified as the 
mean years of teaching experience of all secondary professional 
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employees in a district, excluding administrative personnel. Once 
again, these data were available in raw form from the state Depart-
ment of Education and district means were calculated therefrom. 
Analysis of the data with respect to the elementary experience 
variable (Ee) suggested that more than one specification might be 
advised. It was not unusual to find elementary teachers with twenty-
five or more years of experience, while this was highly unusual for 
secondary teachers. However, this could not be considered indicative 
of a superior position for elementary teachers with respect to salary 
levels for several reasons. Few school districts in Nebraska continue 
indefinitely to pay annual experience increments beyond a certain 
maximum. Thus an elementary teacher with thirty years of teaching 
experience would probably not receive a greater number of salary 
increases for experience than a similar teacher with fifteen or 
twenty years of experience. For instance, the NSEA annually com-
piles a booklet of Nebraska school districts' salary schedules. For 
the 1970-71 school year only one out of more than 200 reporting 
school districts allowed more than fifteen years of experience 
steps on its salary schedule. 
Secondly, many districts will not allow years of experience 
gained in other school systems to be applied for compensation pur-
poses. Finally, for many Nebraska elementary teachers, significant 
portions of their experience were accumulated prior to receIvmg 
the B.A. degree, and this experience might also not be allowed by 
a school system for compensation purposes. 
For all of the above reasons, three different specifications of the 
elementary experience variable were employed. The first was speci-
fied simply as the mean years of total classroom experience of the 
elementary teachers in a given district (Ee). The second specification 
was the mean years of experience of elementary teachers in their 
present system, by district (Eo'). Finally, the first specification was 
modified to allow for the experience maximums often imposed by 
school districts. A maximum of fifteen years of experience was 
chosen and, for any district whose elementary teachers had greater 
than fifteen years of mean teaching experience, fifteen was recorded 
instead of the actual figure (Eo"). These means were all calculated 
from the same Department of Education source used for the sec-
ondary experience variable. 
It was necessary to find proxies for the secondary and elementary 
training variables because raw data on years of education were 
not consistently available. For the secondary training variable two 
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separate forms were employed, the percentage of secondary teach-
ers in a given district who had obtained at least the B.A. degree 
(T.), and the percentage who had obtained at least the M.A. degree 
(T.'). The second specification was added because in only 17 of 
the 201 districts of the sample did less than 100% of the secondary 
teachers have at least the B.A. degree. 
For the elementary training variable (T e) only one proxy was 
used, the percentage of elementary teachers in a district who had 
obtained at least the B.A. degree. For the 1970-71 school year, 141 
of the 201 Nebraska school districts in the sample had less than 
100% of their elementary teaching staffs with at least the B.A. 
degree. 18 These data on degrees held by Nebraska school personnel 
were also obtained from state Department of Education sources. 
As would be expected, it was difficult to devise a meaningful 
specification for the secondary wage-earner variable. Data on marital 
status and teacher ages were generally not available. Since it was 
hypothesized that this effect would tend to be felt more strongly 
at the elementary level, the proxy for this effect was defined as the 
percentage of elementary teachers in a given district who were 
female (S). 
Finally, the negotiations variable was given considerable atten-
tion. As was indicated in chapter 3, several of the previous studies 
were weakened by their questionable specifications of this variable. 
In order to determine the extent to which meaningful negotia-
tions were occurring for the 1970-71 school year, the files of the 
Nebraska State Education Association were searched for master 
contracts or other evidence of negotiations. Since this proved to 
provide insufficient information, a brief post card questionnaire 
was devised and mailed to some 325 local teachers' associations, 
county teachers' associations, and superintendents. 19 The NSEA 
mailing list was used for the mailing and an NSEA cover letter was 
enclosed. Two hundred and twenty-one responses were received; 
of these, 20 were eliminated due to duplication and inconsistencies 
with NSEA files. The remaining 201 responses were used as the basis 
for the sample which was selected. A dummy variable, which took 
the value of one for those districts wherein formal negotiations were 
occurring and zero otherwise, was used for this specification (N). 
The Regression Results 
The results of the ordinary least-squares estimation which was 
applied to the data are presented in Table 1. The first three equa-
<.xl 
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TABLE 1 
~ 
Coefficients and other statistics' from 1970-71 cross-sectional regressions. Dependent variable: 
VJ 
average secondary-average elementary salary differential. Number of observations in each 0 
regression: 201. ~ ~ 
VJ ;:, 
Equation N T, T: Te E, Ee E' e En e S R' i:l 
~ 
-512.1 23.5 -7.6 62.0 -15.8 6.3 .53 ~ (7.21)·'" (1.96)'" (5.l5)· ... (5.59)""" (2.l6)'" (1.7·7) .... 
'" 2 -503.6 26.8 -7.5 60.5 -31.4 6.4 .54 ;:;. 
'" (7.l4)""· (2.27)"* (5.08)· .... (5.55) ..... (2.58) ...... (1.82) .... 0 
-3 -502.0 27.4 -7.7 58.2 -3.2 4.7 .52 "'tl 
(.27) "'" (6.99) ..... (2.29)"* (5.l2) ..... (5.l9)·*" (1.28) 0 
-'" 4 -499.4 10.7 -8.9 42.6 -16.1 4.9 .55 '" '" (7.20) ..... (3.74) ..... (5.93) ..... (3.54)""" (2.28)'" (1.42)" 0' ;:: 
.56 
;:, 
5 -489.7 11.7 -8.8 39.6 -35.3 5.0 
-(7.14)"''' (4.15)"· (5.95)""" (3.37) ..... (2.9B)"*" (1.49)" ~ 
'" 6 -488.6 11.2 -8.9 38.0 -4.2 3.l .54 CJq ~ (6.96)""" (3.87)· ... (5.89) ..... (3.14) ..... (.36) ( .88) ~ .. 
0' 
'In this and all subsequent tables the t-values are located in parentheses below the coefficient. ;:: 
'" 
.. Significant at the .10 level in a I-tailed test. 
... Significan t at the .05 level in a I-tailed test. 
..... Significant at the .01 level in a I-tailed test. 
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tions use the three different specifications of the elementary exper-
ience variable which were described earlier while using the per-
centage of secondary teachers with at least the B.A. degree (Ts) as 
the secondary training variable. The last three equations use the 
same three elementary experience variables, each combined with 
the secondary training variable T s'. 
All of the regression coefficients exhibit the hypothesized signs 
in all the forms that were used. As indicated by the table, all of the 
variables are significant at at least the .01 level, with the exceptions 
of the third elementary experience specification and the secondary 
wage-earner variable in equations 3 and 6. In addition, the crucial 
negotiations variable is significant in all equations at the .01 level. 
The R2 values are consistent with those often obtained from state 
and regional cross-sectional data of this type. 
Both secondary training variables (Ts and T s') yielded coeffi-
cients which were consistent with expectations, and not unexpect-
edly the percentage of secondary teachers with at least the M.A. 
degree (Ts') proved to be the more significant determinant, al-
though smaller in magnitude. The secondary-elementary differential 
did tend to be larger where secondary training was more extensive. 
Similarly, the differential tended to be smaller in those districts 
where most or all elementary teachers had obtained at least the 
B.A. degree. This variable was significant at the .01 level in all 
six equations. 
Experience also proved to be a highly significant determinant 
of the size of the differential, as a highly experienced secondary 
staff tended to be associated with larger secondary-elementary salary 
differentials. And in districts where elementary teachers were rela-
tively inexperienced, the differential also tended to be larger no 
matter what form the variable took. The second specification, the 
mean years of elementary experience in the present system (Ee'), 
proved to be the most significant, which is consistent with the 
observation that many school districts in Nebraska do not accept 
years of experience acquired outside the present system for com-
pensation purposes. 
Although the specification of the secondary wage-earner variable 
(S) was certainly less than exact, the results do indicate that differ-
entials tended to be larger in districts whose elementary staffs were 
predominantly or solely female. However, the coefficients become 
insignificant in equations 3 and 6. 20 
Finally the coefficients of the negotiations variable are all highly 
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significant, as mentioned earlier, and the magnitudes of these 
coefficients are somewhat surprising. The results suggest that, for 
the 1970-71 Nebraska school year, secondary-elementary salary 
differentials did tend to be smaller by some amount between $488 
and $512 in those districts whose salary package had been formally 
negotiated. Although a small portion of this effect could be attribut-
able to differences in extracurricular compensation, the estimation 
still seems to provide strong empirical evidence that formal pro-
fessional negotiations in the Nebraska public schools have contrib-
uted to significantly smaller secondary-elementary salary differentials. 
A Check for Spurious Correlation 
It is possible, of course, that the correlation between negotia-
tions and salary differentials is a spurious one. In other words, 
those Nebraska school districts which exhibited small secondary-
elementary salary differentials in 1970-71 may have consistently 
displayed such small differentials over time, even in the absence of 
professional negotiations. If this is the case, the negotiations vari-
able may be assuming some explanatory power which actually 
should be attributed to other omitted variables. It was decided, 
therefore, to compare the results of the 1970-71 regressions with 
those for a year prior to the emergence of any widespread negotia-
tions in Nebraska. 21 
The 1965-66 school year was selected for this test. The necessary 
data were still available but there was no evidence in NSEA files 
of any formal negotiations in any Nebraska school district for this 
year. The test employed the same variables which were used for 
equation 1 in Table 1 and the same estimation procedure. Since 
some school consolidation did occur between 1965 and 1970 it was 
necessary to omit II of the 201 districts in the 1970-71 sample 
because these systems were not K-12 districts in 1965-66. With the 
exception of the negotiations variable, all of the 1970-71 data were 
replaced with 1965-66 data from the same sources indicated ear-
lier. The negotiations variable was entered as it appeared in the 
1970-71 regressions. If the negotiations variable proved to be as 
highly correlated with the salary differentials of 1965-66 as with 
those of 1970-71, this would indicate that other omitted factors 
besides negotiations were responsible for explaining variations in 
the salary differential. The results of this test are reported in 
Table 2. 
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TABLE 2 
Coefficients and other statistics from 1965-66 cross-sectional 
regressions. Dependent variable: average secondary-average 
elementary salary differential. Number of observations: 190. 
N 
-88.8 
(1.62)" 
T, 
23.6 
(4.17) ..... 
T. 
-8.6 
(7.32) .... 
E, 
-1.2 
(.11) 
.. Significant at the .10 level in a I-tailed test. 
.... Significant at the .05 level in a I-tailed test. 
...... Significant at the .01 level in a I-tailed test. 
.81 
(.14) 
S 
5.98 
(1.17) 
.36 
First, the lower R2 suggests that those hypothesized variables 
which tended to be significant determinants of teachers' salary levels 
and salary differentials in 1970-71 were of less importance in 1965-
66. The secondary and elementary training variables were still 
highly significant and displayed the hypothesized signs. These co-
efficients were of approximately the same magnitude as in the 
1970-71 regressions. This implies that levels of training or educa-
tion were also important determinants of salary levels and salary 
differentials in 1965-66. 
Curiously, however, the secondary and elementary experience 
variables not only were statistically insignificant, but also exhibited 
the wrong signs. This may suggest that fewer salary schedules 
which specified compensation for experience were in use during 
this time. It may also be consistent with the general belief that 
organized labor groups emphasize seniority and seniority rights to 
a greater extent than would be the case in the absence of such 
groups. Perhaps market forces may also provide a rationale for 
these results. The tight labor market for teachers in 1965-66 may 
have tended to negate experience differentials. 
The secondary wage-earner variable was also statistically insig-
nificant. Just as teachers appear to have possessed more monopoly 
power in 1970-71 than in 1965-66, it may be that school boards 
also possessed more power to exploit intradistrict differences in 
labor supply elasticities in the later period. 
Finally, the coefficient of the negotiations variable drops in 
magnitude to -88.8 and is significant only at the .10 level. Thus 
it does not appear that those negotiating districts which tended to 
have smaller secondary-elementary salary differentials in 1970-71 
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had equally small differentials in 1965-66. The original results of 
Table 1 are generally given more credibility by the failure of the 
1965-66 model to display similar explanatory power, especially with 
respect to the negotiations variable. 
Summary 
The regression model which was developed and employed in 
this chapter provides considerable evidence to support the major 
hypothesis that professional negotiations for teachers have had a 
significant impact upon the salary structure of the typical school 
district, and specifically upon the differentials between secondary 
and elementary teachers' salaries. As a rough estimate, the results 
which are presented in Tables 1 and 2 suggest a net negative impact 
upon the average secondary-average elementary salary differentiai 
in Nebraska of between $400 and $425. The magnitude of this 
effect is approximately 5% of the 1970-71 average salary of all 
Nebraska public school teachers, as estimated by the NSEA. These 
results, however, do not provide any evidence concerning the impact 
of professional negotiations upon teachers' salary levels for the 
entire teaching staff in a school district. It is conceivable, of course, 
that negotiations could have merely prompted a redistribution of 
the existing wage bill toward elementary teachers with no net effect 
upon either the school district's average salary level or the size 
of the wage bill. The following chapter addresses itself to this 
second empirical question. 
5. Professional Negotiations and the 
Relative Wage Effect 
A S INDICATED in chapter 2, the salary levels of Nebraska public 
school teachers improved substantially in the 1960s and early 1970s, 
both absolutely and relative to several other states. Since this 
period of time roughly parallels the emergence of professional 
negotiations in the Nebraska public schools, it is logical to inquire 
as to the effect that professional negotiations have had upon these 
improving salary levels. The present chapter deals with this 
question. 
H. Gregg Lewis had distinguished among three different types 
of union wage effects: (1) an effect upon the general level of money 
wages, (2) an effect upon the general level of real wages, and (3) a 
relative wage effect. 1 The primary concern of this chapter is with 
the relative wage or salary effect which is attributable to profes-
sional negotiations in Nebraska, where this relative wage effect is 
defined simply as "comparisons between wages under union and 
non-union conditions." 2 
The first portion of the chapter will consider the theory and 
evidence on the relative wage effects of collective bargaining in the 
private sector. Methodological difficulties will also be mentioned. In 
the second portion of the chapter a salary determination model for 
teachers will be developed and used in an attempt to determine 
the relative wage effect of professional negotiations in the Nebraska 
public schools. 
Relative Wage Effects in the Private Sector 
The Theory. The traditional framework within which to analyze 
the relative wage effects of unionism in the private sector is Alfred 
Marshall's treatment of derived demand in his Principles of Eco-
nomics. 3 This treatment is based upon the determinants of the 
elasticity of a derived demand. From this analysis it follows that 
the more inelastic the demand for union labor, the smaller the 
adverse employment effect associated with a given wage increase 
and, therefore, the larger the probable influence of a union on 
relative wages. 4 Marshall considered four determinants of the 
39 
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elasticity of a derived demand. The demand for a factor will be 
more inelastic: (1) the more essential the factor is to the production 
of the final good, (2) the more inelastic the demand is for the final 
good, (3) the smaller is the ratio of the cost of the factor to the 
total cost of the good, and (4) the more inelastic is the supply of 
other factors. 
The Marshallian analysis suggests the conditions which would 
be most desirable from the viewpoint of the union in affecting the 
wages of its members. It also suggests the probability that economic 
constraints will be imposed upon the union, to the extent that 
these conditions are not simultaneously present. Finally, an inelastic 
demand is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for successfully 
raising union wages. The union must also possess sufficient bar-
gaining power. 
Methodological Difficulties. In testing empirically the relative wage 
effect of collective bargaining within an industry or occupation, 
the ideal situation would be one wherein all other relevant vari-
ables are identical except for the presence or absence of the union. 
Any observed wage differentials obtained in such an ideal case 
could reasonably be attributed to unionization. However, this 
situation can seldom be attained, anc,l the relative wage effects 
that are actually obtained may reflect factors other than collective 
bargaining which were omitted from the analysis. 
Furthermore, it is often argued that the presence of unions in 
some plants forces not only union employers but also nonunion 
employers to raise wages, the latter occurring so as to prevent the 
unionization of nonunion workers. To the extent that these "threat 
effects" or "spillover effects" are present, the observed relative wage 
effect would understate the true union impact. 
Because of these difficulties, empirical estimates of relative wage 
effects cannot be considered precise. It should not be thought, how-
ever, that the existence of such difficulties makes meaningful em-
pirical work impossible in this area. The difficulties presented by 
omitted variables have been lessened in recent years as more sophis-
ticated statistical techniques and more precise variable specification 
have been used. With respect to the possibility of threat effects, 
Albert Rees has observed that the outcome from such effects is far 
from clear. 
In some cases, the union wage increase may be emulated. In others, the effect 
wiII operate through the labor market in the opposite direction. The higher 
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wages in the union sector will tend to check the growth of employment in that 
sector, which will increase the supply of labor to the non-union sector and 
tend to check increases in non-union wages. 5 
Some Evidence. Numerous studies have been undertaken in an 
attempt to derive the relative wage effect of private sector unions 
in a given industry or industry group. Only a brief sampling of 
some findings will be presented here. 6 
Perhaps the first major study of this kind was conducted by 
Paul H. Douglas in 1930. 7 He analyzed percentage wage changes 
in fourteen unionized and nonunionized industries and concluded 
that the unions in these industries were initially a source of wage 
advantage but that in later years the rates of increase for union 
workers' wages were no greater than for nonunion workers. A 1948 
study by Arthur Ross and a 1950 study by Ross and William 
Goldner reached essentially the same conclusions. 8 
With respect to single industry studies, the findings vary con-
siderably. These variations may be partially explained by differences 
in such factors as: the type of union, i.e. craft or industrial; the 
stage of the business cycle when the study was conducted; the 
percentage of industry workers who were organized; and whether or 
not the industry was faced with a declining product demand over 
time. 
Stephen Sobotka's study of the construction industry from 1915 
to 1950 found that unions had gained as much as a 25% advantage 
for highly skilled workers and 5% for unskilled workers.9 Elton 
Rayack found an over-all 5% advantage in the men's clothing 
industry, although this advantage declined over time. 10 In rubber 
tire manufacturing, Irvin Sobel estimated a union wage advantage 
of 5%-10%, again declining after World War n.ll Joseph Scherer 
found a 10% wage advantage in large city hotels, with most of the 
significant gains made in the late 1930s. 12 
There is some evidence that the union impact becomes smaller 
during inflationary periods. Rees found only a negligible union 
impact on wages in the post-World War II steel industry. 13 The 
effect was so small that Rees was led to conclude that collective 
bargaining may have actually retarded the upward movement of 
wages in this period. Similarly, John Maher found little or no 
union impact on wages in four of the seven 1950 industries which 
he studied and only a 5%-10% effect in the other three. 14 
Both Rees and Lewis have estimated an over-all average effect 
of U.S. unions on wages in the neighborhood of 10%-15%. The 
studies cited here also seem generally to suggest that the most sig-
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nificant gains of private sector trade unions came in the late 1930s 
and that their wage impact may have been declining since then. 
In the public sector, the existing empirical work which was 
summarized in chapter 3 suggested a relative wage effect no greater 
than 5% associated with the organized activities of public school 
teachers. The limited work on state teacher markets found no effect 
greater than 3%. Given Wellington and Winter's concern with the 
potential for abuse of public sector unionism, it is somewhat sur-
prising that these effects seem to be smaller than the corresponding 
private sector effects during initial stages of organization. As indi-
cated in chapter 3, however, there are some general shortcomings 
of the existing studies which may limit their explanatory and 
predictive power. The following sections will analyze the impact of 
professional negotiations on Nebraska teachers' salary levels, and, 
in the process, an attempt will be made to overcome some of the 
problems of these earlier analyses. 
A Model of Teacher Salary Determination 
In delineating those factors which are considered by school 
boards in determining teachers' salaries, it was hoped that there 
existed consistent, objective criteria which were employed by most 
school boards. Unfortunately, such criteria do not generally exist. 
As Joseph Kershaw and Roland McKean have observed: 
In the first place, the public schools are producing a service-education for 
the young-which is not marketed at a price to the customers. It is financed 
by taxing the whole community-both those who do and those who do not 
use the product. Not only is this product not sold on the market, but it 
is very difficult even to specify what the product is, and just how the indio 
vidual teacher contributes to it. This makes the problem of setting teachers' 
salaries particularly difficult. In a competitive business that markets its output, 
if wages are set too high, losses will occur; if too low, employees of the right 
quality cannot be retained and again losses wiII show up after awhile. Schools 
have no such cIearcut indicator, so that when it is time to determine salary 
levels, or relations among salaries, this test of the market is not available to 
assist in the determination. One result is that school boards are forever grappling 
with the problem of just what factors they should be taking into consideration. 15 
This statement depicts some of the problems inherent in salary 
determination throughout the public sector. Fortunately, in recent 
years both theoretical and empirical research on this issue have 
been conducted which permit the specification of certain factors 
that are generally of concern to the school board in the salary 
determination process. 16 
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Ability and Willingness to Pay. Since the services provided by a 
school district are not sold to the consumers at a price but rather 
are financed by general taxation, any market forces which may be 
operating are constrained by the amount of fi~ancial resources 
available to a school district and its willingness to tap these 
resources for the provision of educational services. In short, two 
almost universal determinants of teachers' salaries are the school 
district's ability to pay and its willingness to pay educational costs. 
According to Perry and Wildman: 
In recent years, the primary determinant of the level of teacher compensa· 
tion in individual school districts has been the ability of the district to pay .... 
Because teacher compensation is the major cost element in the operation of 
the school system, it has been the ability of school systems to finance salary 
increases which has determined the extent to which these market forces have 
been translated into short·run salary adjustments. 17 
However, ability to pay alone may not be reflected accurately 
in teachers' salaries if the residents of the school district are not 
willing to finance such salaries and other costs through taxation. 
If, as is usually the case, the total wage bilI plus other costs is 
somehow determined first and then tax rates are adjusted so as to 
generate the necessary revenue, one might expect some negative 
relationship between ability to pay and willingness to pay in many 
districts, especially in the absence of professional negotiations. 
Some evidence of this exists in the regression analysis which follows. 
Size of the School District. In addition to ability and willingness 
to pay, it appears from previous work that the size of the school 
district has some effect upon the level of teachers' salaries. Specifi-
cally, salaries tend to be higher in the larger districts. This may be 
the case for several reasons. The cost of living is generally lower 
in those smaller communities which constitute the centers of most 
small school districts. This may be used as a partial justification 
for paying lower salaries. The cost of living is a factor often men-
tioned by school boards in their salary discussions, according to 
Kershaw and McKean. 18 It may also be that larger districts offer 
more specialized programs which require greater teacher skills. 
Furthermore, larger districts are typically located in more urbanized 
areas where competition for teachers' services is keener. Finally, it 
may be that there is more disutility associated with teaching in a 
large school district because of the impersonal working environ-
ment, the disciplinary problems, or other disadvantages related to 
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the bureaucratic atmosphere. To the extent that this is the case, 
larger districts would be required to pay higher salaries so as to 
overcome these disutilities. 
Labor Market Structure. Labor market structure considerations 
may also affect teachers' salaries. Several of the studies surveyed 
in chapter 3 found that the possession of school district monopsony 
power did adversely affect teachers' salaries. As mentioned in pre-
vious chapters, school district consolidation in Nebraska has not 
been widespread. There are, therefore, a very large number of 
independent school districts in the state, which implies that school 
district monopsony power should be small or nonexistent in most 
districts. Nevertheless, consideration will be given in the analysis 
to this possible salary determinant. 
Finally, the central hypothesis of this chapter is that teachers' 
salaries are partially determined by teacher monopoly power. Given 
the relatively insignificant monopsony power which is expected in 
Nebraska school districts and the historically low salaries of the 
state's teachers, the relative salary effect of professional negotiations 
in Nebraska should provide an estimate approaching the upper 
limit attainable through organized teacher activities. 
The Formal Model. The factors discussed above constitute the 
variables which are hypothesized as determinants of Nebraska 
teachers' salary levels. 19 Assuming linear relationships, the model 
may be summarized in the following regression equation form: 
S = a + bA + cW + dE + eM + fN + u 
where: 
S _ teacher salary level by district 
A - school district ability to pay 
W school district willingness to pay 
E school district size (enrollment) 
M school district monopsony power 
N teacher monopoly power (professional negotiations) 
u random error term 
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The preceding discussion suggests that positive signs should 
be expected for the coefficients of all the independent variables 
except the monopsony variable (M). As will be seen in the section 
on specification of the variables which follows, the particular 
specification of the monopsony variable which was chosen implies 
a positive sign for this variable, also. 
The Sample 
The sample consisted of 181 K-12 Nebraska school districts. 
The key factor in selecting the sample was once again the avail-
ability of reliable information on the presence or absence of nego-
tiations in a given school district. Thus, the same sample of 201 
school districts which was used in chapter 4 was first selected. Of 
these 201 districts, 20 more were omitted because salary data of 
the type needed for the model were not available. Again, the sample 
seemed generally to be representative of the entire population of 
Nebraska's K-l2 school districts, including the rural-urban balance 
noted earlier. For the same reasons which were given in chapter 
4, the 1970-71 school year was selected once more for primary 
analysis in the study. 
Specification of the Variables 
Ordinary least-squares multiple regression analysis was again 
employed in deriving all the estimated coefficients. Specification of 
the dependent variable (S) was of special importance and five 
different specifications resulted. Following the lead of previous 
studies, four points on the salary schedule of a given school district 
were selected for the first four specifications. These points were 
the B.A. minimum (S1), B.A. maximum (S2), M.A. minimum (S3)' 
and M.A. maximum (S4) salary levels as read off the salary schedule. 
These points are representative of the entire salary schedule for a 
district, and they are often considered the strategic targets of pro-
fessional negotiations. 
However, these points may not be indicative of actual salaries 
paid by a district because actual salaries are dependent upon where 
teachers are placed on the schedule. For this reason, a fifth specifica-
tion was defiined as the average actual salary level of all classroom 
teachers in a district (S5)' Although average salaries may not be 
the direct target of professional negotiations, they may be said to 
reflect the economic benefits derived from such negotiations. 
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There is a problem involved with the inclusion of this last 
specification. An average salary measure presumably includes the 
influence of interdistrict variations in the education and experience 
of teachers, and no independent variables were included to account 
for these variations. However, since the effects of these variations 
in education and experience were considered in the previous chap-
ter, it was concluded that the advantages of being able to estimate 
the economic benefits of professional negotiations through this 
variable outweighed the disadvantages. 
The 1970-71 data on school district salary schedules were ob-
tained from the annual publication, Nebraska Salary Schedules, 
compiled by the NSEA. Average salary figures were obtained from 
the 1970-71 Nebraska Educational Directory, published by the 
Nebraska Department of Education. 
A given school district's ability to pay (A) is dependent upon 
its local financial resources plus any state supplements to those 
resources which may be forthcoming. The following formula was 
used in deriving the measure for ability to pay: 
(V + A,,) 
A 1\1 
E 
where: 
V 1970 assessed property valuation by district 
As = 1970 state aid by district 
M 1970 general educational fund mill levy by district 
E 1970-71 resident enrollment by district 
The ~ ratio is a measure of the additional assessed valuation 
which would be necessary to generate local tax revenues equal to 
the state aid. This formulation allows both sides of the numerator 
of the formula to be expressed in comparable terms. 20 Inclusion 
of current enrollment (E) as the denominator of the formula allows 
the expression of the measure on a per pupil basis. Property valua-
tion, mill levy, and enrollment data were all available from the 
Nebraska Educational Directory. State aid figures were obtained 
from the 1970-71 Financial Report submitted by each school dis-
trict to the state Department of Education. 
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Devising an appropriate measure of a school district's willing-
ness to pay (W) was not as difficult as first expected. 21 Although 
several variations of this variable have been defined in other work, 
they all amount to some measure of a community's willingness to 
tax itself for educational purposes. The simplest and yet most 
precise measure of this willingness, and the one utilized here, is 
the general educational fund mill levy of a district. 
The school district size variable (E) was simply defined as total 
resident enrollment, but for the monopsony variable (M) only a 
rough proxy could be specified. Following the work of Landon 
and Baird and of Schoenberger, monopsony power was defined in 
terms of the number of school districts in a county. If monopsony 
power exists in a school district, it presumably could be exercised 
more easily in those geographic areas where only a few school 
districts exist to compete for the services of teachers. Although a 
county may not be the ideal geographic unit to use for this pur-
pose, it appeared to be as good as any other. Since monopsony 
power should be greater where the number of competing districts 
is small, the expected sign of the coefficient of this variable is 
positive, as mentioned earlier. Again, the Nebraska Educational 
Directory provided the data on number of school districts per 
county. 
The negotiations variable (N) employed was once more a 
dummy variable of the same form and obtained from the same 
sources as the one used in chapter 4. 
The Regression Results 
The results of the regressions are summarized in Table 3. One 
regression equation was estimated for each of the five specifications 
of the salary variable. With the exception of the monopsony 
variable, all of the regression coefficients exhibited the expected 
signs and were significant at at least the .I 0 level. The negotiations 
variable was again significant in all cases at the .01 level. 
The R2 values show somewhat more variation than the values 
derived in chapter 4. This is not totally surprising, however, nor 
is it inconsistent with the similar variations found in other studies 
using salary specifications of this type. One would not expect the 
hypothesized variables to have equal explanatory power for all 
points on the salary schedule. The values of these points are 
partially determined by the recruiting and retention needs of 
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individual school districts. Furthermore, it would be expected 
that these values are affected by the number of teachers who 
actually qualify for placement on the different steps in particular 
districts. 
TABLE 3 
Coefficients and other statistics from 1970-71 cross-sectional 
regressions. Dependent variables: BA minimum (S1)' BA maxi-
mum (S2)' MA minimum (S3)' and MA maximum (S4) salary 
schedule steps; and average salary level (S5). Number of observa-
tions in each regression: lSI. 
Dependent 
Equation Variable A W E M N 
S1 .002 3.97 .009 S.39 122.92 
(2.51) .... " (4.37)· .... (6.69) ...... (2.07)"* (7.9S)· .... • 
2 S2 .006 17.56 .041 12.52 293.55 
(1.35)" (4.63) ...... (7.23) .... " (.74) (4.56) ...... 
3 S3 .006 4.63 .005 -7.35 301.0S 
(2.74) ...... (2.20)"* (1.46)" (.7S) (S.43) ...... 
4 S4 .025 24.S6 .049 41.4S 795.37 
(3.S0) ...... (4.10) ...... (5.32)" "* (1.53)" (7.72) ..... 
5 S5 .012 11.93 .030 -9.96 609.30 
(2.67) ...... (2.90)**" (4.S5) ...... (.54) (S.71)· .... • 
"Significant at the .10 level in a I-tailed test . 
.... Significant at the .05 level in a I-tailed test. 
...... Significant at the .01 level in a I-tailed test. 
R2 
.54 
.44 
.39 
.50 
.47 
The coefficients of the ability to pay variable (A) were all con-
sistent with the hypothesis. The drop in significance of the co-
efficient when associated with the B.A. maximum salary level (S2) 
is interesting. Presumably, many districts with a substantial ability 
to pay as defined are able to employ a higher quality teacher. 
Therefore, they may wish to establish a relatively low B.A. maxi-
mum salary so as to provide an incentive for their teachers to seek 
the M.A. degree. Relatively poor districts may have few teachers 
with the M.A. degree. Teachers in such poor districts would tend 
to concentrate their salary demands at the B.A. maximum level. 
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The willingness to pay variable (W) also proved to be a signifi-
cant determinant of teachers' salaries. As mentioned earlier, how-
ever, there is evidence that willingness to pay and ability to pay 
are negatively related. The simple correlation coefficient between 
the two variables was -.29, not large enough to cause any significant 
multicollinearity problems but of sufficient magnitude to suggest 
such a negative relationship in some districts. 
Teachers' salaries also seemed to be significantly affected by 
the size of the school district (E), although this factor loses some 
of its significance at the M.A. minimum step. No explanation was 
apparent for this loss of significance. 
As suspected, school board monopsony power (M) was not found 
to be a very important factor in salary determination. The co-
efficients of the monopsony variable were statistically insignificant 
in three of the five equations, and they even became negative for 
the M.A. minimum and average salary specifications. 
Finally, the negotiations variable (N) proved to be a highly 
significant determinant of teachers' salary levels in all equations 
used. In terms of points on the salary schedule, the results suggest 
that those districts which were engaged in professional negotiations 
did pay higher salaries than those which were not, even when the 
other factors are taken into account. At the B.A. minimum level, 
the difference was $123, or about 2% of the average B.A. minimum 
salary in nonnegotiating districts. At the B.A. maximum step the 
differential was about $293, or 4.2%. For the M.A. minimum step, 
negotiating districts paid $301 more, or 4.1 %, and at the M.A. 
maximum level, the differential was $795, or 7.2%. 
It is not surprising that professional negotiations seemed to 
have a greater impact at the upper steps than at the lower steps. 
As indicated previously, it has been argued that market forces are 
more predominant at the entering step and that bargaining is more 
effectively manifested at the upper steps. 22 Furthermore, those 
teachers who are most active in the negotiations process tend to be 
career teachers who fall on the upper steps of the salary schedule. 
As Perry and \,yildman conclude: 
The exercise of teacher power has led to larger increases for long service 
teachers and for teachers with an M.A. degree than would have been forth-
coming in the absence of the exercise of power. These increases have tended to 
benefit the most active members of the teacher organization at the expense of 
inactive members or non·members.23 
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Finally, in terms of average actual salaries equation 5 indicates 
that negotiating districts paid salaries averaging $609 higher than 
nonnegotiating districts in 1970-71. This is 8.4% of the average 
salary in nonnegotiating districts. Although no variables for the 
composition of the teaching staff were included, this effect is still 
somewhat larger than those which have been estimated in previous 
studies. 
The Spurious Correlation Check 
It was again possible that those negotiating districts which paid 
higher teachers' salaries in 1970-71 had always paid higher salaries, 
irrespective of negotiations. A check for spurious correlation similar 
to the one employed in chapter 4 was used to explore this possi-
bility. 
Once again, the 1965-66 school year was selected for the test. 
However, there were no reliable data on salary schedules for this 
year. The test was therefore limited to the variables used in equa-
tion 5 of Table 3, the data for which were available from the same 
sources indicated earlier. The same estimation procedure was 
employed and the same eleven consolidated districts which were 
omitted in chapter 4 were deleted from this sample. Data from 
1970-71 were replaced with 1965-66 data, except that the negotia-
tions variable was entered as in the 1970-71 regressions. 
As before, if the results showed that the negotiations variable 
was as highly correIa ted wi th 1965-66 salary levels as with those of 
1970-71, the implication would be that omitted variables other 
than professional negotiations were responsible for explaining 
variations in Nebraska teachers' salary levels. The results of this 
test are presented in Table 4. 
The R2 value suggests that the model has somewhat greater 
explanatory power for 1965-66 than for 1970-71. On the surface 
this may seem surprising, but with further thought it appears to 
be consistent with expectations. 
The ability to pay variable is again a significant determinant. 
The magnitudes of the coefficient and the t-statistic imply that 
ability to pay may have been a more important factor in teachers' 
salary determination in the earlier year. A similar observation can 
be made for both the willingness to pay variable and the district 
size variable. 
Although school district monopsony power did not prove to 
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be of much importance in the salary determination process for 
1970-71, it assumes somewhat more significance in the 1965-66 
regression. It is conceivable that teacher monopoly power over-
whelmed any school board monopsony power which existed in 
1970-71. This was clearly not the case in 1965-66. 
TABLE 4 
Coefficients and other statistics from 1965-66 cross·sectional regressions. De-
pendent variable: average teacher salary by district. Number of observations: 
170. 
Dependent 
Variable A 
S5 .028 
(8.26)"'" 
w 
28.54 
(10.57)""" 
E 
.030 
(6.75)" .... 
"Significant at the .10 level in a I-tailed test. 
""'Significant at the .05 level in a I-tailed test. 
.... "Significant at the .01 level in a I-tailed test. 
M 
22.82 
(1.99)"" 
N 
52.77 
(1.33)" 
R2 
.61 
The negotiations variable is the least important of all the 
1965-66 variables, being significant only at the .1 0 level. The 
coefficient suggests that 1970-71 negotiating districts paid salaries 
which were only about $53 higher on the average than other 
districts in 1965-66. 
These results once again support the major hypothesis that 
professional negotiations have contributed significantly to increased 
teachers' salary levels. The 1970-71 negotiations variable loses 
most of its explanatory power when applied to 1965-66 data, al-
though collectively the increased explanatory power of the other 
variables more than compensates for this loss. 
Su.mmary 
The results of the estimation procedure conducted in this 
chapter, as summarized in Tables 3 and 4, do suggest that pro-
fessionally negotiated Nebraska teachers' salaries were significantly 
higher than unilaterally determined salaries for the 1970-71 school 
year. The relative wage effect associated with professional negotia-
tions, in terms of points on the salary schedule, ranged from $123 
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to $795, or from roughly 2% to 7% of nonnegotiating districts' 
salary levels. In terms of actual average compensation levels, the 
net relative wage effect was in the neighborhood of $550, or ap-
proximately 8% of unorganized districts' salary levels. 
As mentioned previously, these effects are somewhat larger than 
those found in most other studies of teachers' salaries. At least 
two tentative reasons have already been suggested for this. First, 
Nebraska teachers' salary levels were among the lowest in the 
country in the early 1960s. The emergence of professional negoti-
ations in the late 1960s provided a convenient mechanism through 
which to facilitate the "catching up" process. Secondly, monopsony 
school board power does not seem generally to be as influential a 
force in Nebraska as in many other states and regions. The teacher 
organization movement was, therefore, not confronted with the 
market resistance which apparently typified several other teacher 
markets. A possible third explanation for the magnitude of the 
effect is that Nebraska school districts enjoyed almost total spending 
autonomy in 1970-71 and previously. The effectiveness of profes-
sional negotiations was not hindered in any significant way by 
state-imposed spending lids or by restrictions on local mill-levying 
authority. As suggested earlier, given this relatively favorable en-
vironment for the introduction and growth of organized teacher 
activities, it may be that the relative wage effects which were esti-
mated in this chapter are among the highest which can be expected 
from professional negotiations for public school teachers, at least 
in the existing economic climate. 
6. Conclusions and Suggestions 
For Further Research 
Further Interpretation of Results 
I T HAS BEEN a basic hypothesis of this study that professional 
negotiations for public school teachers have had an impact upon 
both the structure and the level of teacher compensation. This 
expectation has been confirmed in the analysis of chapters 4 and 5, 
at least insofar as Nebraska teachers are concerned. The results of 
cha pter 4 suggest that secondary-elementary salary differentials 
within a given Nebraska school district tended to be significantly 
smaller, by over $400, where salaries were professionally negotiated. 
There is little other evidence on the wage structure impact of 
professional negotiations, and further research is clearly warranted 
on this subject. 1 
With respect to the impact of professional negotiations upon 
relative salary levels, the results presented in chapter 5 suggest a 
salary differential ranging from approximately $123 to almost $800 
associated with organized school districts. The relative wage effect 
varies from roughly 2% to 8%. Although this effect is somewhat 
larger than those found in previous similar studies, it has been 
argued here that Nebraska may not truly be a representative teacher 
market due to the unusually favorable economic and political 
environment for professional negotiations found in this state. 
Nevertheless, the relative wage effects which were derived for 
Nebraska in this study may be extremely useful as rough estimates 
of the upper extreme presently attainable through professional 
negotia tions. 
Even though the magnitudes of the estimated relative wage 
effects may not seem large in an absolute sense, it should be noted 
that the period of time in question was one of rather persistent 
inflation. H. Gregg Lewis has estimated a relative wage effect 
range of from 0% to 5% attributable to unions for the private 
sector of the economy during such periods of inflation. 2 Relative 
to these estimates, the magnitudes of the effects derived here 
assume somewhat greater significance. 
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However, it is still probable that ability-to-pay constraints which 
confront public sector organizations are a characteristic which 
distinguishes them from most private sector institutions. To the 
extent that this is the case, public sector unions may have consid-
erable difficulty in fully exploiting any existing labor demand 
inelasticities. Perhaps these ability-to-pay constraints explain why 
the relative wage effects derived in this and other studies have not 
been as large as those which Wellington and Winter envisioned. 
Although the favorable environment found in Nebraska may 
have introduced an upward bias in the magnitudes of the observed 
effects, the sample selection process of this study may actually have 
resulted in a bias in the opposite direction. The availability of 
salary and negotiations data necessitated limiting the samples of 
chapters 4 and 5 to K-12 Nebraska school districts. The lowest 
teachers' salaries in Nebraska, however, tend to generally be found 
in small rural school districts of a K-6 or K-8 structure. As indicated 
previously, there is little evidence of the existence of formal 
negotiations in these rural districts. Had the data been available, 
the inclusion of a number of these districts in the sample would 
undoubtedly have resulted in both a greater structural impact and 
a larger relative wage effect associated with professional negoti-
ations. 
Finally, on a somewhat more speculative note one must certainly 
consider the future prospects for professional negotiations in Ne-
braska as being relatively favorable. All available evidence, pre-
sented here and elsewhere, suggests that the teacher organization 
movement will continue to be dominated by the NEA in Nebraska, 
with little successful encroachment by the AFT. The relatively 
conservative political environment found in Nebraska and the 
successful development of the public sector bargaining framework 
culminating with the CIR are both factors which suggest that the 
strike will be a very uncommon recourse in future public sector 
disputes, as it has been in the past. Short of a renewed constitu-
tionality challenge, the present statutory provisions would appear 
to be more than adequate for dealing with foreseeable disputes. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
In addition to the need for further research on the salary 
structure effects of professional negotiations, a number of other 
related areas of inquiry deserve mention. The persistent problem 
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of spill-over effects has always plagued research efforts on the impact 
of organized labor. There is a need for the development of a 
research methodology which isolates these effects with some preci-
sion so that the union effect may be estimated more accurately. 
Also, the impact of professional negotiations may not be limited 
to salary effects. Little is known about the influence of organized 
teacher activities on class size, fringe benefit compensation, the 
incidence of teacher moonlighting, teaching staff turnover rates, 
etc. For instance, it would be especially interesting to estimate the 
extent to which organized teacher groups are successful in main-
taining present staff levels in the face of projected declining public 
school enrollments in the near future. In the long run effects of 
this type may actually be of greater importance than the salary 
effects, and research attention should be given to them. 
In terms of long-run considerations, several other questions 
arise. In the private sector, long-run time-series estimates of union 
relative wage effects generally have shown significant initial wage 
gains followed by a declining impact over time. It remains to be 
determined whether such a trend will also become prevalent in the 
public sector, although recent occurrences lend support to this 
expectation. Certainly, resistance to public sector union demands 
can be expected to intensify over the long run, both because of 
ability-to-pay limitations and because of clearly observable recent 
changes in sentiment toward public employees. In the past, the 
relative salary disadvantage of public sector workers was common 
knowledge. During the last ten years, however, this disadvantage 
has largely disappeared, and this change has also become common 
knowledge. For teachers, specifically, there is some a priori justifi-
cation for expecting such a declining effect. As Perry and Wildman 
have concluded: 
In the absence of technological change which reduces the ratio of certificated 
personnel to students, there is no strong basis to predict that collective bargaining 
and teacher group power can or will have a permanent effect on the level of 
teacher salaries and compensation. Without such a change, there is no certainty 
that either the community or the school system will, over the long run, provide 
the funds required to finance such increases. Thus, the short-run increases in 
compensation achieved through collective bargaining and the exercise of teacher 
group power should perhaps, at this time, be regarded as the result of a shift 
in time of compensation increases. 3 
There is the further question of whether school boards in states 
such as Nebraska will be able to retain their spending autonomy 
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III the future, and of what effect any lost autonomy will have on 
the power of local teacher organizations. According to Myron 
Lieberman and Michael H. Moskow: 
It seems likely. therefore, that there will be decreasing fiscal independence 
for school boards and greater emphasis upon the preparation and approval of 
school budgets as part of a larger scheme of public finance. Negotiations by 
teachers and other groups of public employees will have to be coordinated, and 
such coordination will result in some decrease in the autonomy of local school 
boards. 4 
This diminished local autonomy may come in the form of the 
aforementioned state-imposed spending lids, restrictions on local 
mill-levying authority, and/or legislation for the mandatory equali-
zation of resources among districts. The issue of equalization has 
gained added support from recent court decisions, and its emergence 
has very significant implications for the future effectiveness of pro-
fessional negotiations. According to Lieberman and Moskow: 
Collective negotiations could intensify existing inequalities of educational oppor-
tunity. In affluent school districts, teacher pressure may be effective in achieving 
greater expenditures for education. In poor school districts, such pressure will 
be relatively ineffective; the local school district may simply not have the 
resources to meet teacher demands .... Should this happen, the result might be 
even greater pressure to finance education from state and federal instead of local 
sources. 5 
There is some evidence from this study that those districts with 
greater available resources do pay higher teacher salaries. However, 
the contention of Lieberman and Moskow that professional negoti-
ations may intensify inequalities in educational opportunity is one 
which should be given a thorough empirical analysis. 
Finally, it is possible that professional negotiations may have 
an effect upon the rate of school district consolidation in different 
parts of the country. As teachers become more unified at the local, 
state, and national levels in their demands for higher salaries and 
improved working conditions, some pressure may be felt by local 
school districts to unite in order to effectively resist such demands. 
Consolidation would also offer certain advantages for districts which 
are faced with the necessity of generating additional school revenues. 
The extent to which this effect actually materializes is another 
important empirical question for future researchers. 
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Appendix A. 
A Hypothetical Salary Index Schedule 
For Teachers 
BA+36 
Step BA BA+9 BA+18 BA+27 orMA MA+I8 MA+36 Ed.D. 
0 1.00 1.05 l.l0 l.l5 1.20 1.30 1.40 1.60 
1 1.06 l.l1 1.17 1.22 1.28 1.38 1.49 1.69 
2 U2 l.l7 1.24 1.29 1.36 1.46 1.58 1.78 
3 U8 1.23 1.31 1.36 1.44 1.54 1.67 1.87 
4 1.24 1.29 1.38 1.43 1.52 1.62 1.76 1.96 
5 1.35 1.45 1.50 1.60 1.70 1.85 2.05 
6 1.52 1.57 1.68 1.78 1.94 2.14 
7 1.64 1.74 1.86 2.03 2.23 
8 1.71 1.82 1.94 2.12 2.32 
9 1.90 2.02 2.21 2041 
10 1.98 2.10 2.30 2.50 
11 2.18 2.39 2.59 
12 2.48 2.68 
In the above schedule, the vertical increments under the heading 
"Step" represent years of teaching experience. The horizontal steps 
are for the successful completion of additional hours of college 
credit beyond the indicated degree. Given a base salary, a uniform 
schedule of this type allows for the computation of any teacher's 
salary by merely multiplying the base salary by the index number 
located at the appropriate horizontal and vertical step. 
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Appendix B. 
Reproductions of Questionnaires 
Form sent to local teachers' associations: 
Name of School ____________________________________________________ _ 
1) For what school year did teachers at your school first engage in 
formal or informal professional negotiations which resulted in a 
bilateral agreement? 
2) Would you classify these first negotiations as formal or informal? 
3) Have annual negotiations occurred continuously since the above 
date? 
4) Additional Comments ____________________________________________ ___ 
Form sent to county teachers' associations: 
Name of schools represented ______________________________________ __ 
by your organization 
In as many of the above schools as you can determine, for what 
school year did teachers in that school first engage in formal or 
informal professional negotiations which resulted in a bilateral 
agreement? (If no negotiations have as yet occurred, write 
none.) 
Additional Comments 
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